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This research investigates a critical tier in the global flow of information about 
terrorism. This qualitative study employs 35 in-depth interviews with national 
security journalists in the Washington, D.C. “prestige press” (Stempel, 1961) to 
explore their perceptions surrounding the collection, interpretation and dissemination 
process of terrorism news content. This study includes a review of the recent 
rhetorical shift from President Bush’s “War on Terrorism” to “Overseas Contingency 
Operation” attempted by President Obama’s Administration. Rarely studied, but 
extremely influential, these particular “front line” reporters offer substantial insider 
knowledge on evolving trends in the news media’s production process on terrorism 
and national security. Their unique geographical position allowing for daily 
interaction among American governmental leadership, combined with their 
responsibility to cover what could be argued as one of the most influential topics of 
  
our time – terrorism, offers readers an inside view of the daily constraints, strategies 
and perceptions of this elite group. Data analysis adhered to grounded theory methods 
using constant comparison. Findings include evidence of new and evolving journalist 
routines with implications for public policy and the evolving integrity of journalist 
practices. Moreover, extending the published literature in the mass communication 
theory and national security realms, this research offers value by analyzing and 
describing the news production processes and perceptions - for the first time - of th  
D.C. national security prestige press. Reported results should also offer practitioners 
new insight into best practices and an opportunity for information users to better 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
Over the last decade, journalism studies have examined the news frames 
resulting from the events of September 11, 2001. In this framing study, the 
perceptions of national security prestige press are explored regarding how they frame 
terrorism as journalists.   
Certainly, various theoretical approaches have been applied to media and 
terrorism scholarship, but none have prevailed in substance and momentum more than 
framing theory (Goffman, 1974). In fact, “framing studies have far outstripped” the 
other related mass communication theories in overall use over the past ten years 
(Weaver, 2007, p. 146) and have been broadly and often applied to media with 
regards to terrorism (Edy & Meirick, 2007; Entman, 1991; Schaefer, 2003; Ruigrok 
& van Atteveldt, 2007) as a basis for understanding how media cover terrorism. 
Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon. However, until the events of 9/11, no 
single terrorist attack had killed more than 500 people (Hoffman, 2006, p. 19). 
Tragically, the United States experienced large-scale terrorism n 9/11 claiming 
2,976 lives on American soil. Since then, the United States government has launched 
a more visible, global discussion on terrorism with an increased focus upon finding 
and stopping terrorists around the world under the 
“war on terror” banner, rhetorically-similar to the phraseology used in otherpolicy 
campaigns such as “war on drugs” or the “war on poverty.”  
Terrorism is not new to scholarship. Researchers have parsed and examined 
myriad facets of this topic including its definition, group formation and motivation, 
radicalization, recruitment, female and youth participation, prevention, preparedness 




have even explored the complex relationship between terrorism and the mass media, 
as well as the role of the media in communicating about terrorism (Altheide, 2004, 
2006; Cho et al., 2003; Graber, 2003; Norris, Kern & Just, 2003; Nacos, 2007). As 
one scholar summarizes, “when one says ‘terrorism’ in a democratic society, n  also 
says ‘media’… for terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which 
depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 177). 
It is for this reason that former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously 
termed publicity as “the oxygen of terrorism” for she understood that attracting the 
media is a primary component for the intended success of a “spectacular” terrorist 
event (Nacos, 2007, p. 175).  
Terrorism is not new to journalism. Well, at least outside of America. 
American mass media followed the “war on terrorism” so closely that this group is 
itself credited (or blamed) for a “contribution to major changes in social definitions 
and meanings of….’9/11’ and ‘terrorism’” in America (Altheide, 2004, p. 304).  Even 
with decades of experience covering terrorism, much of post-9/11 international 
literature faults even global journalists for conveying an “over-identifica on” with 
America -- writers who “merged with Americans in a cultural geography of 
attachment” using words such as “we” and “us” (Sreberny, 2002, p. 223). The attacks 
of 9/11 were defined by American news media as an attack not only on American 
culture, but on civilization itself (Altheide, 2004). 
Post-9/11, terrorism media coverage in America not only increased, but also 
introduced new routines to the journalism occupation (Barnett & Reynolds, 2009). 
Scholarship is laden with many cases of a reporter’s routine shifting to include a blind 




national security-related information (Moeller, 2009). What research has tersely 
explored are the evolving routines and trends regarding terrorism-related news 
coverage from the insider viewpoint of the national security reporter, namely those
journalists who are employed by a media outlet to seek out and disseminate 
information for their audiences on matters of national security and terrorism. These 
issues could include a wide variety of topics such as acts or attempted acts of 
terrorism, tragedies initially presumed to be terrorism, counterterroism measures, 
government intelligence gathering, military action and coverage of the various 
government agencies handling national security matters. 
Study Purpose 
The broad purpose of this study is to examine Washington, D.C. national 
security prestige press perceptions regarding their beat, their word choice and their 
occupational future by broadly asking, “What’s right with terrorism coverage?” and 
“What’s wrong with it?” Generally, this can help to describe contemporary frming 
of media discourse about terrorism. Specifically, the perceptions of these journalists 
are explored at the individual level to better understand their news gathering routie 
and how these media understand and frame terrorism in their stories.  
Using framing literature, this research examined how these reporters 
understand and frame terrorism issues in their own stories. Using scholarship that 
examines the media-terrorist relationship, this dissertation explored how this group 
understands the interplay of terrorist goals and radicalization with media coverage. 
This portion took a more historical look at journalist perceptions of United States 




well as their own assessment of immediate post-9/11 and War in Iraq reporting -- 
largely criticized in academic scholarship.  
Moreover, building on Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences 
model, this dissertation sought to explore, at the individual level, how D.C.-based, 
national security TV, radio and newspaper reporters understand and engage with their 
occupational routines in general. This included how they understand daily constraints, 
freedoms and skill set requirements for their particular beat, the handling of source  
and their perceived role in beginning the global media wave.   
Barring one mixed methods study (Rosten, 1937) credited as being the first to 
attempt to describe Washington, D.C. newspaper journalists, there is little scholar hip 
that explores the many factors that influence D.C.-based reporter’s decisions on the 
news production process. Moreover, Rosten’s classic work only analyzed the 
newspaper medium and did not focus on the national security issue. Therefore, on a 
broad scale, this dissertation updated Rosten’s work to explore the perceptions and 
attitudes of a reporter group who, it could be easily argued, serve as the initial portal 
through which terrorism news coverage begins – Washington, D.C.-based, TV, radio 
and newspaper journalists who cover national security and terrorism.  
Likewise, this dissertation enhanced the important line of inquiry offered in 
Lewis and Reese’s (2009) study, but on a much larger scale. Their research explored, 
via 20 minute in-depth interviews, the perceptions of 13 USA Today journalists from 
across America regarding the “War on Terror” frame. This dissertation expanded 
their work by employing 35 participant interviews averaging an hour each. Also, this 
work focused solely on Washington, D.C. national security journalists and broadened 




Among other findings, this study revealed how Washington, D.C. national 
security journalists interact with their employers, audiences and sources. Moreover, 
research revealed evidence for decreased access to sources post-9/11 that has ushered 
in the new journalist routine employing increased acceptance and use of anonymous 
sources; this new routine, coupled with recent news industry cutbacks, has led to 
increased reporter autonomy. Moreover, there is new cynicism surrounding changes 
in, and use of, government rhetoric. Supporting recent framing research, this study 
also found support that the “War on Terror” frame has naturalized into the journalist 
psyche. Results showed that the “War on Terror” frame has not yet vanished, the 
“Overseas Contingency Operation” has not been able to replace this frame, and that 
reporter framing of terrorism may be directly affected by White House 
Administration “personality” perceptions. Finally, with the emergence of new 
technologies and recent economic downturns resulting in news industry cutbacks, this 
research revealed increasing challenges for managing new, high-speed pac s in 
mainstream reporting as well as the prediction by many journalists of the impending 
death of the national security prestige press. 
Concepts, Scope and Definitions 
Several concepts utilized in this study require definition, context and clarity. 
The pertinent terms are prestige press, press/media/journalist/reporter, news, the 
United States intelligence community, national security/homeland security reporting, 
terrorism and the “War on Terror” frame.  
Prestige Press 
This study is unique for several reasons, but of utmost importance are its 




The “prestige press” is a term coined by G.H. Stempel (1961) to denote the 15-20 
newspapers that were, at that time, influencing future story choices by other media.
“Prestige press” in this case, denotes journalists who garner, often first-hand, 
information/accounts directly from Washington administration elite and other top 
government officials and serve as the front lines media who often begin the “news 
wave” (Fishman, 1980) of an “echoing press” (Domke, Graham, Coe, Lockett John & 
Coopman, 2006) caught up in a trickle down effect (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008). 
This group serves as the funnel through which other global media adapt stories, 
definitions and frameworks. They are in a position to prompt, influence or even 
control much of the national discourse on the subject. As a matter of influence, the 
prestige press audience is not only the American public, but in most cases, key 
policymakers and the entire world. Sometimes referred to herein as “elite press,” this 
should not be confused with an “elitist press” – which has been argued to piously 
spout one ideology over another. 
In the 21st century (and therefore used herein), this term is often used to refer 
to those reporters from nationally-known media outlets of the three modern 
mainstream media formats (newspapers, radio and television) who enjoy direct acc ss 
to government elites in Washington, D.C.; for this study, those reporters who have 
become the world’s primary conduit for terrorism-related news coming out of the 
United States (Couldry, 2000; Kellner, 1995; Reese & Danielian, 1989). As one 
scholar argued regarding public policy communication channels, the personal 
“interface between journalists and elites is a key transmission point for spreading 
activation of frames” (Entman, 2004, p. 11). This small group of journalists, whom 




have become the front lines of national security journalism (Dimitrova & Stromback, 
2008; Entman, 2004).  
Press/Media/Journalist/Reporter  
In today’s collegiate communication courses, students are often taught that 
“media” is the proper term for the broader public of journalists from all mass 
channels, as “press” has traditionally referred to the newspaper in relaton to he 
printing press. However, for this study the terms “media” and “press” are used 
interchangeably to encompass both traditional and modern mass communication 
forms of daily information and opinion presentation including broadcast, print and 
electronic newsgroups, or any form of mass communication used to relay a message 
to the general public.  
In line with other scholars, this study describes those within the population 
being studied as “those who had responsibility for the preparation or transmission of 
news stories or other information - all full-time reporters, writers, correspondents, 
columnists, photojournalists, news people, and editors” (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996, p. 
248). This definition excludes freelancer journalists, tabloid writers and editorial 
staff, talk show hosts, cartoonists, librarians, camera operators, video/audio 
technicians and those journalists whose stories solely appear online.  
News 
News is defined in this study as a constructed reality of journalists using 
“pertinent information gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the 
relationship between what is known and how it is known” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 82-83). 
Ultimately, most scholars have agreed that news is a product that journalists create 




United States Intelligence Community 
The Intelligence Community includes a broad range of executive branch 
agencies and organizations. These entities work in tandem to gather foreign relatio s 
intelligence and protect the national security of the United States. Members of this 
group include (in alphabetical order): Central Intelligence Agency, Defens  
Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy (Office of Intelligence & 
Counterintelligence), Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence & 
Analysis), Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence & Research), Department of 
Treasury (Office of Intelligence & Analysis), Drug Enforcement Administration 
(Office of National Security Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (National 
Security Branch), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Nation l Reconnaissance 
Office, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, United States Air Force, 
United States Army, United States Coast Guard, United States Marine Corps and the 
United States Navy. Additionally, the Director of National Intelligenc  serves as the 
head of the IC. This person advises the U.S. President, the National Security Council, 
and the Homeland Security Council, as well as supervises and employs the National 
Intelligence Program (National Security Agency, 2009). 
National Security/Homeland Security Reporting 
 Given the hundreds of definitions for national and homeland security 
(Weimann, 2004) and for purposes of this study, these concepts will be operationally 
defined as they are perceived by study participants. Even for various media outlets, 
there is a stark difference among the understandings of national security versus
homeland security. Generally, however, “national security” denotes a focus on 




and actual terrorism incidents. These agencies would include the Department of 
Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and government 
contractors.  
“Homeland security” is seen as denoting the protection agencies that seek to 
prevent and respond to a terrorist incident such as the Transportation Security 
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Other formal beat 
names include Intelligence, White House, Military, and Pentagon. Although 
bioterrorism issues are often handled by the Health & Human Services agency, 
“health” is, in most every major D.C. outlet, a separate beat outside of the terrorism 
realm, just as food protection by the USDA is considered a separate topic.   
As the third largest United States Cabinet department, DHS contains 22 
agencies under its umbrella that cover, per the demarcation above, both national (their 
response mandate) and homeland (their protection mandate) security practices 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
Obviously, there is overlap when covering terrorism issues. Reporters, editors 
and producers often determine which beat a journalist(s) will cover by story topic 
(from beginning to end, regardless of its various angles) based on their staffing 
resources and on a case-by-case basis. For example, one D.C. media outlet has four
reporters covering matters of national and homeland security, so they can better parse 
which angles and agencies each journalist will develop sources inside, whereas 
another outlet has only two reporters covering this beat, leaving them to delineate the 
agencies, and hence the scope of their beat, in a different way. For this study, the 






Although “terrorism” has more than 100 different definitions (Schaffert, 1992) 
and no widely agreed-upon definition even within any one realm (academia, intra-
U.S. agency, international community, media), for the purposes of this research the 
term will be operationally defined in a broad sense to mean any deliberate or 
threatened violent act against civilian targets (whether event victims or event 
audience) intended to create fear within those targets and with a goal of media 
attention and political or ideological change.  
“War on Terror” Frame 
 This frame first took root during the Reagan Administration to define the 
U.S.-led fight against state-supported terrorism occurring in the Middle East and 
Latin America (Chomsky, 2002). After 9/11, President Bush utilized this frame 
during his September 20, 2001 address to a joint session of Congress. Specifically, 
President Bush said, “Our war on terror will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Wilson & Kamen, 2005) and 
“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end here” (Staff, 2010). 
Mainstream media rapidly adopted this frame and continued its use even after the 
Bush Administration attempted to change the phrase to “global struggle against 
violent extremism” just days later. However, it was too late; global media had easily 
digested the frame and thus began what has been a decade of debate regarding its 
impact on U.S. public policy and military action enacted in retaliation of the 9/11 
attacks.  
Fast forward to March of 2005 with the attempt of a rhetoric shift by the new 




Administration “appears to be backing away from the phrase ‘global war on ter r,’ a 
signature rhetorical legacy of its predecessor… in a memo e-mailed this week (March 
25, 2009) to Pentagon staff members, the Defense Department's office of security 
review noted that ‘this administration prefers to avoid using the term 'Long War' or 
'Global War on Terror' [GWOT.] Please use 'Overseas Contingency Operation’” 
(Wilson & Kamen, 2005). As comedian Jon Stewart predicted, the new phrase “will 
catch on like Crystal Pepsi” (Baker, 2009). In 2010, it is clear that this attempted 
change in rhetoric has failed as evidenced by media silence in using the term. 
Whether this media choice is due to the term’s vague content, its wounded context or 
its source originator has not yet been determined.   
Method 
Because this dissertation explored the perceptions and roles of journalists, the 
study design utilized individual, in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted 
with Washington, D.C.-based national security reporters (in many cases, this i the 
actual formal beat name employed by their organizations) working for U.S. nationally-
recognized newspaper, radio and/or television outlets who are the first point of contact 
to investigate news about terrorism with top government officials in D.C. Access to 10 
of these reporters from a previous, IRB-approved study (Epkins, 2008) helped to recruit 
additional participants through a snowball, convenience sample of 35 interviews 
conducted over 10 months. Given several participants of this study shared that the 
national security prestige press of Washington, D.C. is approximately only 40 strong, it 
seems this research was able to capture a large portion of the total population.  
All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. Details on participant 




email is attached in Appendix A, Appendix B is the IRB consent form and the 
interview guide is attached in Appendix C. 
Delimitations 
In order to more specifically define the scope of this research, there are seve al 
delimitations to outline. First, barring directly relevant literature to the theoretical 
framework for this dissertation and given the vast amount of literature on mass 
communication theory, this dissertation primarily used post-9/11scholarship that also 
included media analysis. Classic and foundational works were also included, where 
appropriate, for a more robust understanding of the theories discussed. It follows, then, 
that unless the literature reviewed is relevant to media coverage of terrorism p st-9/11 
or are foundational or directly relevant works of theories discussed herein, it was not 
introduced.  
Second, most of the literature is drawn from United States-based scholarship. 
Though there is modern media and terrorism scholarship that seeks to analyze global 
practitioners through the lens of 9/11 and the role of other national governments in their 
respective nation’s handling of their specific terrorism issues and their press corps, 
(Cram, 2006; Orttung & Makarvchec, 2006; McBride, 2007), due to disparate media-
government models and relationships within the global community and the variance in 
terrorist dealings per nation (Martin, 1985), as well as the prominence of American 
prestige media as a nexus point for international media (Couldry, 2003; Kellner, 1995; 
Reese & Danielian, 1989), particularly on terrorism issues, the literatur review is 
delimited to focus on the dissertation area concerning how the American media -- 
particularly D.C.-based media -- covers terrorism information disseminated primarily 




Third, although ethical questions and answers did arise, given the extremely 
broad scope of media and journalism scholarship, this study did not explore the massive 
amount of literature surrounding media ethics, but instead focused more on the news 
production process, role and function of this study population. 
Fourth, regarding type of media outlet studied, this was delimited to only 
include mainstream, nationally-recognizable newspaper, radio and television outlets
based in Washington, D.C. Much of framing scholarship available has explored 
mainstream media channels, traditionally considered as most “prestigious,” and 
research on new media has just recently flourished. Therefore, this study remained 
grounded in scholarship exploring Washington, D.C. major mainstream news media 
outlets. 
Finally, for data collection, this study focused mainly on journalists who cover 
national security matters directly and on a daily basis. This excluded reporters who may 
cover the occasional terrorism-related issue for other beats such as the Department of 
Energy or Health and Human Services -- two government agencies that also engage in 
counter terrorism strategies. However, not only is a D.C. journalist solely covering 
these two agencies rare, this is not the case for any of the outlets examin d herein.   
Research Significance 
This work contributed to mass communication scholarship by exploring, for 
the first time, the individual level perceptions of this rather new, post-9/11 genre of 
reporter -- Washington, D.C.-based, national security prestige press -- who cover 
terrorism-related issues on a daily basis as the initial portal or conduit through which 
this information is channeled to the American public and, in many cases, the rest of 




(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) to include this new reporter population and address its 
existence in a post-9/11 world. 
Moreover, this research addressed one of the most important frames of the 
current era, the “War on Terror,” and provided a timely exploration of a recently 
attempted frame shift by the Obama Administration to “Overseas Contingecy 
Operation.” Scholars have called for the expansion of framing theory when reporting 
on terrorism and have communicated an urgency to understand how these reporters 
consume, internalize and disseminate such information (Lewis & Reese, 2009; Reese 
& Lewis, 2009; Barnett & Reynolds, 2009). Given evidence supporting media 
“convergence” (Reese & Danielian, 1989), the “news wave” (Fishman, 1980), an 
“echoing press” effect (Domke et al., 2006) and prestige media influence over not 
only other news organizations (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008) but also public policy 
(Entman, 2004), it is crucial to understand from the beginning of the wave, how these 
journalists adapt to changing routines and adopt (or not) the communication frames 
disseminated by government elites. This research expanded framing scholar hip by 
finding that specific journalist perceptions regarding the Administration in power 
could be influencing how terrorism is presented in their work.     
This research expanded terrorism and national securities scholarship by 
directly addressing the timely topic of terrorism and the communication channels so 
integral to terrorist goals. Generally, terrorism research is a burgeoning, albeit lacking 
field, potentially due to the capacity of every issue to be seen through a terrorism 
lens, leaving linkable scholarship well-dispersed across the disciplines. Concluding 
that the terrorism field has too few researchers because of the difficulty in studying 




found that terrorism research was not only disparate across disciplines, but also 
methodologically lacking. For example, Silke’s study found the use of only open 
source data and little first generation data and that more than 80% of the journal 
articles and the 160 terrorism-related studies over the decade prior to 2000 were each 
published as "one-offs" where the author never followed up. Moreover, Silke (2004) 
later argued that terrorism scholarship relies too heavily on secondary research with a 
dearth of scholars willing to utilize primary research. Another shortcoming in 
literature, according to a recent 15-year content analysis of framing literature in 
general, is the exclusion of non-content analysis studies on the strategic frames of the 
communicator themselves (Matthes, 2009). This study is one of only a few 
communication-based studies to explore these topics qualitatively, bringing relevant 
communication theory to the table while bridging the disciplines of national 
securities, political science and mass communication. 
In the face of few qualitative terrorism studies, this research also offered 
methodological advances to aid in the understanding of how the national security 
prestige press of Washington, D.C. report on terrorism. With greater qualitative 
depth, a more holistic understanding of key news-building components that can only 
be discovered via in-depth interviews was obtained. This offered a balance of rich 
data sets exploring the personal opinions, beliefs and attitudes of journalists in action 
as evidence of (or fodder for) the theoretical set of mechanisms that construct and 
determine the process of disseminating news about terrorism.  
Scholarship has also attempted a normative dialogue on how media should 
handle the breaking of such news. One media ethics scholar even posed great urgency 




requires the media immediately to go about “carefully analyzing communication about 
terrorist acts so as not to serve the needs of terrorist organizations and a small number 
of people who thrive on hate, fear and destruction” (Bowen, 2005, p. 81). Others have 
deeply anaylzed the process of frame transmission, reification and naturaliz tion to 
examine its practical impact on public policy choice (Reese & Lewis, 2009). This 
dissertation collected current-day national security reporter perceptions on such 
matters.  
Finally, this work sought to contribute to praxis by encouraging or discovering 
better ways of reporting about terrorism that might help discourage further viol nce 
and/or act as an effective catalyst of information, and perhaps even comfort, to their
audiences (Entman, 2004; Fox, 2003; Nacos, 2007).  
In Epkins’s (2008) pilot study of 10 interviews with D.C.-based national 
security prestige press and Lewis and Reese’s (2009) recent interview res arch with 
journalists across the U.S., both found that national security journalists themselves are 
frustrated with the use of the “War on Terror” frame by both government and their 
colleagues as they seek to succinctly but accurately communicate nebulous yet central 
terms to their audience. Therefore, the study findings offer practical contributions and 
identify best practices to journalists as they seek, consume, interpret, and disseminate 
the “War on Terror” frame and terrorism information in general, to the public at large.  
Dissertation Outline 
Chapter Two of this dissertation will review pertinent mass communication 
literature and note related national security/political science scholars ip. Within mass 
communication, the literature will focus on the areas of building news content ad 




Within national security and political science literature, this study overviews classic 
political science scholarship by seasoned scholars who have examined the historical 
interplay between media and terrorism long before September 11, 2001. Chapter Two 
also provides the theoretical basis referred to throughout the dissertation. 
In Chapter Three, methodology is detailed and the rationale for choosing a 
qualitative approach to examine research questions, including data collection me hods 
and procedures, as well as data analysis, interpretation, validity and ethics issue  is 
offered. 
In Chapter Four, participant data results are presented. This section is 
organized by the four Research Questions outlined at the end of Chapter Two.  
In Chapter Five, this study offers discussion and analysis, as well as 
identifying limitations of this research, with potential implications for future praxis 
and research on related theory and national security reporting for a post-9/11, 
Washington D.C. prestige press culture. Appendices include recruitment materials, 




Chapter Two – Conceptualization 
Overall, this dissertation used the application of theories that explain the 
building of news media content as well as literature that has explored the complex 
relationship among media, terrorists, the government and the citizenry. In general, 
media studies argue that journalists socially construct meaning for their audiences 
merely by the selection and omission of components making up a news story (Reese 
& Lewis, 2009). Furthermore, the concept of social constructionism has paved the 
way for the construct of framing (Scheufele, 2000). Therefore, numerous studies now 
link a journalist’s background, characteristics and experiences to their personal and 
intrinsic “frame” (Reese & Lewis, 2009). Moreover, many individual level factors, 
including a journalist’s personal background, experiences, attitudes, values and 
beliefs potentially shape media content -- all of which can be considered as their 
personal frame of reference (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 65). Therefore, the 
following literature streams provided a framework for this research: framing, the 
hierarchy of influences model, social constructionism, media and terrorism and 
national security studies.  
Framing  
This dissertation explored scholarship that uses the application of framing 
theory to examine news content building in a post-9/11, mediated environment 
(Bennett, 2003; Entman, 2004; Reese, 2007). Framing theory offers an opportunity to 
explore the intricacies of the news production process because this theory provides a 
window into the “selection, emphasis and exclusion that furnish a coherent 




framing studies have shown that a media frame affects the audience frame (Pf u t al., 
2004). 
Overall, framing describes the process of content selection and exclusion, 
highlighting certain aspects over others to communicate a particular point of view. In 
many ways, a frame facilitates the nature of an argument -- specifically, 
communicating a certain bent, context or angle of an issue that, in itself, lends an 
interpretive meaning of the communication. As Jamieson and Waldman (2003, p. 1) 
put it, “journalists deliver the world to citizens in a comprehensible form.” Some 
scholars argue that framing “tells us how to interpret communication” (Bowen, 2008 
p. 339). Perhaps the most utilized definition in scholarship, Entman denotes framing 
as selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality to make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (1993, p. 
52). However, Reese more broadly defines framing (used as this study’s operational 
definition) as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent ov r time, 
that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (2001, p. 11). 
However, the concept, scope and criteria of “framing” are inconclusive and still hotly 
debated in scholarship (Reese, 2007).  
Unavoidably as reality is never “unframed,” a frame is both an effective, and 
an affective narrative device beholden to an implicit or assumed worldview had the 
story been told through the eyes of another. Often seemingly innocent in its individual 
use, ultimately a frame can become part of a cycle where it is “transmitted” and 
“reified” so many times that it becomes “naturalized” (Lewis & Reese, 2009).  The 




negate alternative frames after mass acceptance. For example, in their cont nt 
analysis of the associative framing that emerged from the impact of “the global event 
of 9/11,” findings indicated that the 9/11 attacks created “a strong framework of 
Muslims as terrorists in all investigated media.” (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007, p. 
68, 86).  
More specifically, frames exercise the power to control and shape public 
policy debate (Entman, 2004). This coupled with the power of media to influence 
both general public perceptions and specific public policy (Capella & Jamieson, 
1997; Edy & Meirick, 2007; Patterson, 1993), and the implications are urgently 
relevant in a post-9/11 world.  
Scholars have labeled and discussed specific interpretive media frames 
introduced immediately post-9/11, including the “manufacture of heroism” frame and 
“the demonization of Saddam” frame (Keeble, 2004, p. 52, 55), as well as older 
frames contributing to today’s interpretive and ritual choices, such as the “us vs. 
them” frame beget during the Cold War (Moeller, 2004, p. 63). One scholar 
summarizes the utility of this frame in scholarship saying, “the ‘war on terror’ is a 
rich current framing case from the past, perhaps the most important of our time” 
(Entman, 2004, p. 152).  
Frames emerge and strengthen where journalists and elites interact “and it is 
not always easy to determine where the line between “elite” and “journalist” should 
be drawn, or who influences whom” (Entman, 2004, p. 11). In fact, the “War on 
Terror” frame can no longer be directly associated to any one sponsor or political 
opinion, as this frame is now considered to have achieved a macro level status (Reese, 




A more recent framing study found support for the creation, promotion and 
spreading of frames, to both officials and the media, as a product from a hierarchy of 
political actors (Entman, 2003). The cascading activation model depicts the greatest 
power to frame among administration entities such as the White House, State, and 
Defense Departments. Moreover, this model allows for congressional members and 
policy think tanks to possess the ability to spread frames, albeit not as easily. Building 
on Bennett’s (1990) influential indexing hypothesis, Entman predicted the escalation of 
alternative frames only in the face of elite disunity. Furthermore, Entman argued that 
alternative frames will only spread to the higher echelons in his model when soci ty 
demands actually reach these powerful officials. Nevertheless, whoever “wins the 
framing contest…gains the upper hand politically” (Entman, 2004, p. 9). 
Generally, literature on media framing of terrorism-related matters has centered 
on hindsight judgment, via case studies, and argues parochial framing of the lead up to 
the Iraq war after 9/11 that “complied fully with U.S. administration policy and never 
acknowledged the appropriateness of an entirely, alternative frame” (Boyd-Barrett, 
2004, p. 29). Moreover, scholars posit that this was planned and induced by the Bush 
Administration (Moeller, 2004, Norris et al., 2003). As Boyd-Barrett (2004) further 
argued, this was specifically accomplished handily through the White House ‘me sages 
of the day’ which allowed for intra-government agreement (framing) as well as 
controlling the day’s media agenda. 
Furthermore, while there is evidence that the government may initially set the 
media agenda, over time the public is also conditioned to understand the historic 
discourse of a topic, for example terrorism, within a certain framework that is 




public opinion, both the government and the media appeal to the audience in these 
well-traveled frames. Scholarship also supports prevalence of this kind of rhetoric 
utilization in countries with long histories of terrorism (Sadaba & La Porte, 2006, p. 
86). The “War on Terror” frame, for example, has become the crux of both reporting 
and understanding homeland security issues in America (Norris et al., 2003, p. 4). 
Framing the Framers. Overall, literature supports the extensive news 
coverage of 9/11 as the evolution for the “framing of terrorism into an ‘event’” and 
the subsequent feel of “prime time terrorism” that has now surfaced as an ever-
increasing component in “the strategic calculus of terrorists” (Volkmer, 2002, p. 238). 
While it is clear that terrorists attempt to infiltrate these news frames and government 
elites frame their messages for journalist use as well, it follows that journalists 
themselves are not immune to framing and are also susceptible to the framing of other 
journalists. Interestingly, journalists often frame their own pursuit of “truth” as a 
“heroic” quest… in the face of obstacles including sources with political agendas the 
journalist must see through” (Peterson, 2007, p. 256). 
Scholars indeed have found empirical support for journalists adopting frames 
from other journalists – a type of contagious framing. While Nacos asserts that medi  
patterns often engage in “follow-the-leader syndrome” (2002, p. 98), Entman more 
specifically argues that a few top news organizations are followed by the rest of 
media in “a pecking order” (2004, p. 10). In fact, there is evidence of a media 
“convergence” (Reese & Danielian, 1989), a “news wave” (Fishman, 1980) and an 
“echoing press” (Domke et al., 2006). While these concepts are often applied to 
media at large (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008), some in scholarship argue that the 




which other media glean their stories, definitions and frameworks from which to 
perform their own reporting routine, caught up in a trickle down effect (Dimitrova & 
Stromback, 2008; Entman, 2004, Epkins, 2008). From a media values perspective, the 
journalist knows that the mention (or framing) of terrorism, for example, inheretly 
offers traction to any media story (Epkins, 2008), therefore, arguably “elite 
newspapers can influence other news organizations (italics added) and the policy 
makers in each country” (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008, p. 207) by sparking copycat 
coverage. 
Although journalists and their stories are often portrayed in classic 
communication studies as beholden to social context and common news production 
routine (Fishman, 1980; Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Schudson, 1978; Shoemaker & 
Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978), reporters are “always engaged in practices of 
interpretation that precede and order their practices of representation” (Peterson, 
2007, p. 256). Indeed, media framing is central to, and organizes, how people socially 
construct everyday reality. Given that people, like frames, are not static, one scholar 
posits that framing should be approached from “the more dynamic, ‘organizing’ 
ability of frames rather than the singular attributes of a frame” (Reese, 2004, p. 152).  
The effects of framing have been voraciously debated in scholarship over 
many decades (Reese, 2001a; Reese, 2001b; Scheufele, 2000). Scholars generally 
agree that media profoundly impact the formation of opinion regarding the public 
agenda (Iyengar, 1987; Patterson, 1993). As Kern et al notes, media framing is 
“consequential” and influences “the political process, public policy and international 
affairs” (2003, p. 298). Therefore, even though Gilboa cautions that scholars have not 




among the government, the media and public opinion” (2005, p. 337), if terrorists are 
aiming for publicity and media possesses the power to impact public opinion and 
public policy, then understanding the relationship between media framing and 
terrorism is crucial.  
However, within the attempt to build operational models to explain post-9/11 
media coverage, many scholars are concerned that the elite “discourse of fear” uses 
the media to frame and “promote a sense of disorder and a belief that ‘things are out 
of control’…where fear reproduces itself, or becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy” 
(Altheide, 2006, p. 994; Chermak, 2003). Alternatively, newer literature suggests that 
the public is no longer responding to such framing attempts. Coining the word 
“routinization,” Liebes and Kampf (2007) suggest that pervasive media coverage 
leads to a predictable, constrained and more aloof perception of terrorism coverage as 
time passes and a culture of immunity or desensitization protrudes.  In fact, these 
authors posit that “coverage has turned from black and white to shades of grey in 
which the traditional villain is not exclusively evil and the hero is not exclusively 
righteous” (p. 115).  Perhaps, both the media and the public are becoming hardened to 
the hype of terrorism media coverage, finding it all too routine and making it difficult 
to build operational media models. 
Therefore, with the recent emergence of a “special terror-related genre within 
journalism,” (Mogenson, 2008), the application of framing theory to this group of 
national security prestige press, and the acknowledgment of their role both as framers 
and frame consumers, offers the opportunity to build upon the individual level of 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model of news content influence.  By applying this 




terrorist and elite government sources, more can be learned more about contemporary 
national security media coverage in the United States.  
Lewis and Reese Frame Cycle Model 
In the second portion of a two-part study, Lewis and Reese (2009) explored 
how 13 USA Today journalists from across the country made meaning of the “War on 
Terror” frame in general, and whether their personal discourse matched the framing 
cycle (transmission, reification and naturalization) as proposed by Reese and L wis 
(2009) in their previous content analysis of the same interviewed reporter’s work
from 2001-2006. Overall, Lewis and Reese (2009) found support for their hypothesis 
that journalist personal discourse showed strong evidence for the embracement of all 
three phases in the framing naturalization process. This second study also discovered 
support for “the malleability of the “War on Terror” frame—its ability to stretch and 
evolve over time, subsuming new enemies while occluding others” (p. 22).  
Using the “War on Terror” frame, in their first study that introduced the 
journalist’s “model for interpretive framing” (Reese & Lewis, 2009, p. 780), these 
scholars proposed a framing process that ranged from a simple policy description, 
reflecting what was proposed as the cascading effect (Entman, 2003) of a frame’s 
influence from White House to press, to a frame’s adoption by a journalist as an 
unquestioned “condition of life” (p. 784). Specifically, this cycle begins with 
transmission, or the words spoken by a frame’s sponsor. Next, that frame is reifi d 
when journalists take and use an abstract frame as an uncontested fact. Finally, 
naturalization turns a frame “into a state of being – lifting policy into a larger 
narrative of struggle and heroism” (p. 788). However, the author’s purport that this 




their study’s time frame.  
Hierarchy of Influences Model  
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) argue there are five levels they term the 
“hierarchies of influence” that affect the news building production process; these 
levels include individual, media routines, organizational, extra-media and ideological 
(p. 64). From micro to macro, these various levels examine the forces which shape 
news content building. In general, these authors argue that hierarchically, “what 
happens at the lower levels is affected by, even to a large extent determined by, what 
happens at the higher levels” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p. 12).  This model helps 
to explain the larger structure within which journalists function and “determine under
which conditions certain factors are most determinative” (Reese, 2001b). Using a 
visual model of concentric circles (Figure 1) to illustrate various levels of influences 
on media content, the authors sought to provide a new direction for mass 
communication research arguing for a “shift in research tradition” (Shoemaker & 
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layered process of news production as a series of hierarchal connections. This notion 
deflected the prevailing view in scholarship at that time that an individual reporter 
was the sole influence on media content (p. 17-20). Nonetheless, it is clear that this 
model presents each level in an order, a hierarchy, which indicates that one influence 
is more powerful than another. For example, these authors suggest that the power of 
media routines “take on a life of their own” and supersede the power of individuals to 
influence media content (p. 106). This logic continues to the ideological level of 
influence as the authors assert that this level “subsumes all the others we have been 
talking about and, therefore, is the most macro of the levels in our hierarchy of 
influences model” (p. 223). 
Individual Level of Influence. In a follow-on article to the hierarchy of 
influences regarding use of this model by one of its founders, Reese argued that 
although a journalist is not the sole force in the production of news, these levels can 
act separately and together. He further conceded that often “the power to shape news 
is held by the individual journalist, and journalist studies attribute great importance o 
individual characteristics in shaping the news product” but that these studies “are not 
often linked to specific outcomes.” Reese also stated that a researcher must find 
“under which conditions certain factors are most determinative and how they interact 
with each other” (Reese, 2001b, p. 180). 
Furthermore, Reese asserted that normally, “studies treat journalists as 
typically undifferentiated with regard to their location in the organization, and the 
influence of elite journalists and key gatekeepers is understated by the attempt to 
emphasize the broad occupational features of this group” and continued by saying 




“power of specific individuals within the group who have advantageous structural 
‘gatekeeper’ locations” (Reese, 2001b, p. 180).  It is clear that the hierarchy of 
influences model views the press as a social system and does not leave room for any 
journalist or group of journalists to act as independent social actors.  
However, recent research has found mounting evidence for reporters breaking 
out of the hierarchy of influences model within the context of reporting on terrorism 
and national security-related matters. Specifically, scholarship has revealed that in 
breaking television news situations such as terrorism, a journalist’s personal biases 
perhaps most strongly influence news structure and angle due to the instant news 
turnaround required and the need for journalist-as-source in these high-pressure, solo 
situations (Reynolds & Barnett, 2003). Similarly, in the case of journalist military 
embeds, evidence has been found for sole reporter autonomy with little to no 
censorship interference, including editor control (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009; Kim, 
2010).  
Moreover, other scholarship has supported this finding for journalists in 
general. In a panel study of 400 reporters regarding changes of professionali m for 
U.S. journalists, scholars found that reporter autonomy had risen three points from 
2002-2007 with nearly half of the reporters sharing, “they had almost complete 
freedom to decide which aspects of a story to emphasize” (Beam, Weaver, & 
Brownlee, 2009, p. 282). Therefore, this study focused on the individual journalist 
level by investigating the personal perceptions of reporters themselves to d termine 
the power of specific journalists who have the advantage of being located inside the 






Another helpful theoretical approach is the social construction of reality 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This perspective might help explain why a reporter 
might depend on personal biases when covering a sensitive, out-of-the-ordinary-
routine topic. Broadly, the theory of social constructionism suggests that people 
create their own reality from social interactions with others; the world as they know it 
is constructed via individual backgrounds, beliefs, knowledge and biases. When 
covering national security-related matters, this theoretical perspective also offers 
strong support that an individual’s social constructions of reality may supersede, even 
consume, other hierarchy levels in situations where the immediacy of getting 
terrorism-related news to the public is often a one-shot opportunity.  
One way to examine social constructionism is to unpack the ways in which 
individuals and groups share in the construction of their perceived social reality. 
Often, this includes exploring the means by which social phenomena are created, 
reified, institutionalized and understood. This process is ongoing and dynamic with a 
strong possibility for change, as meaning can shift from human to human and over 
time. Therefore, when studying framing – also a dynamic process – this no ion of 
shared construction is also pertinent. 
For example, as Norris, Kern and Just argued, there was an immediate, post-
9/11 “shift in the predominant news frame used by the American mass media for 
understanding issues of national security, altering perceptions of risks at home and 
threats abroad” (2003, p. 3-4). Certainly this shift affected, and was in part cre ted by, 
journalists as well. On the surface it appeared that every journalist beat, at l st for a 




include questions about terrorism after any disaster or crime (Chermak, 2003), but 
presidential administration and government agency secrecy immediately heighten d 
post-9/11 leaving journalists with a great need to allow additional anonymous sources 
into their stories in order to do their jobs (Epkins, 2008).  
The national security prestige press of Washington, D.C. may operate in a 
culture unique only to them. Nevertheless, understanding how this “first responder” 
(Lepre & Luther, 2007) group who can begin the global “media wave” (Fishman, 
1980) socially constructs news content is useful to explain the adoption of terrorism 
news frames, as well as unique routines, that may have even spawned from the 
individual level for this group in particular. 
Media and Terrorism 
Overall, recent terrorism and media scholarship rarely offers qualitative work, 
rather mostly broad conceptual, ethical and historical pieces, as well as specific news 
content analyses. In fact, use of qualitative methods has become a significant gap in 
terrorism literature (Horgan, 2010). However, there are several scholarly books and 
articles from other disciplines available that are helpful in understanding the 
intersection of terrorism and media.  
One of the foremost scholars in political science regarding the multi-face ed 
relationship between terrorists and the media, Brigitte Nacos, asserted that terrorists 
commit violent acts seeking three main objectives: attention, recognition, and 
legitimacy (1994, p. 54). Most scholarship agrees with her assessment and has further 
concluded that for a terrorist, “there is no such thing as bad publicity” (Bowen, 2005, 
p. 86), often asserting that “terrorists see the media as a powerful tool” (Weimann, 




countless news stories for the media, and at the same time, terrorists exploit the media 
for both tactical and strategic purposes to mobilize support and gain public 
recognition” (Nagar, 2007; see also Martin, 1985; Dowling, 1986; Laqueur, 1976). 
Even the now oft employed labels in literature of “mass-mediated terrorism” 
(Nacos, 2003) and “media-oriented terrorism” (Weimann & Winn, 1994) -- 
illustrating that the only way the public can understand terrorism is through the media 
-- serve as evidence of “the centrality of media considerations in the calculus of 
political violence that is committed by non-state actors against civilians” (Nacos, 
2003, p. 23).  
Scholars warn about the professional relationship between media and terrorist, 
cautioning that “news coverage of terrorist activities carries a double-edg d sword of 
legitimizing the terrorists versus informing and warning audiences of threat” (Bowen, 
2005, p. 81); without virulent publicity, terrorists would be unable to reach their 
objectives (Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2007). Nacos argued that for the terrorist, 
“political violence -- especially so-called ‘terrorist spectaculrs’ -- always results in 
widespread news reporting and mass-mediated debates,” thereby influencing public 
policy on at least the awareness level (2000, p. 175). Several scholars suggest that 
scholarship be updated to account for changes in a post-9/11 world (Moeller, 2004). 
More recently, content analysis scholarship showed that a new paradigm has evolved 
“whereby terrorists have become regular, sought after sources, achieving status in 
which they…to some extent set the agenda” (Liebes & Kampf, 2007, p. 78).  
In fact, this profound media access ushers terrorists into close proximity with 
a democratic society and its’ decision-making process, which in turn, can help 




in modern times, “terrorist perception of mass media depends upon their perception 
of probable media impact” (Torres-Soriano, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, looking to 
increase their recognition and legitimacy, terrorists calculate their potential to attract 
media that provide them with an opportunity to become one side of the “triangle of 
political communication” (Nacos, 2003, p. 12). Not only do terrorist groups enjoy a 
24-7 news cycle allowing for maximum exposure of their own violent acts, but 
modern communication technologies such as the Internet, have now enabled them to 
bypass mainstream mass media and communicate directly with individual citizens – 
even personally recruiting future members of their group (Sciolino & Mekhennet, 
2008).  
While many studies point to the power of the media (and now user-generated 
gatekeeping) as gatekeepers for what the public will think about (Lewis, Kaufhold, & 
Lasorsa, 2010), it is only recently that scholarship has examined media coverage of 
domestic terrorism in the United States. In a content analysis of terrorism media 
coverage from 1980-September 10, 2001, results indicated the media rarely covered 
domestic terrorism incidents, but would devote more articles and words to domestic 
terrorism incidents if they included casualties, domestic terrorist groups, airlines or 
hijacking drama (Chermak & Greunewald, 2006).  
Government Role in a Post-9/11 Mediated Environment. The ability of the 
public to make informed political and economic decisions rests upon honest, open 
communication. In fact, democracy itself depends on the content and accuracy of 
terrorism-related communications (Mythen & Walklate, 2006). However, when 
national security is at stake, government restraint of available informati n, “in the 




and convenience in lieu of accountability. Several Washington, D.C.-based national 
security reporters concur that there “is a security lens for everything now” and 
“everything gets stamped ‘national security’ …and what’s happened in many instances 
is government has become less transparent if you throw up the whole issue of security
in front of it” (Epkins, 2008, p. 11).  
American media pervades global culture via exportation and circulation on a 
greater scale than any other world media (Kellner, 1995). Therefore, much of the 
current research on media coverage of terrorism is generally informed by, if not 
centered on, the relationship between American media and American government 
officials. Currently, this literature ranges from tactical to practicl operational strategies 
within the U.S. government, as well as inside the press corps, to manage the flow of 
information regarding terrorism matters in an age of burgeoning technological 
innovations; most discusses the power or inability of government to set the agenda for 
media.  
For example, in his study on the “net effect” of new technology on the 
American government, Robinson revealed a “government loss of control over the 
information environment and a news media that was…more likely to be adversarial and 
‘off-message’” (2004, p. 99). But, this is not necessarily good news for the journalist 
since the same “24-hour news and real-time reporting may create the impression of 
greater transparency, accuracy, and diversity, but the superficial nature of such 
coverage can actually limit the overall depth and quality of reporting” (2004, p. 101).   
While some scholars are leading us to consider that the government may be 
losing its ability to control framing, most scholars find copious evidence of a powerful 




piece, Moeller argued that “after September 11… the US media generally acquiesced 
with the deliberate terminology chosen by the administration” using President Bush-
originated terms like “the war on terror” and “terrorist” that eventually were applied “to 
Bush foreign policy goals without attribution” (2004, p. 69). She called this an 
“enormous success” in agenda-setting by President Bush. A more recent qualitative 
study of how Swedish and U.S. newspapers have framed the war in Iraq suggested “th  
media agenda is often set by government officials rather than by journalists or editors” 
(Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008, p. 207; Entman, 2004; Bennett, 2003), affecting the 
relationship between these institutions. 
Scholars have insisted that the media can be unidirectional in its source choi  
through an over-reliance on official sources (Sparrow, 2006) with evidence to suggest 
that “media serve mostly as mouthpieces for government’s rehearsed platitudes…and 
only mirror statist discourse” (Aday & Livingston, 2008, p. 103). For example, 
scholars have recently found that the U.S. and British coverage of war continued to 
utilize dominant national frames on both mainstream and media outlet websites 
relying on national security as justification for war, while Arab channels framed the 
war as Western imperialism (Powers & el Nawawy, 2009, p. 267). However, another 
research stream has emerged to support only specific criteria for such allegations.  
“Event-driven news,” spawned from dramatic events (i.e. terrorism), is not only 
“more likely” to occur in today’s high-tech world, but begets an important exception to 
the media as government pawn argument (Lawrence, 2000; Livingston & Van Belle, 
2005). Robert Entman’s cascading model of state-media relations posits that journ lists 
covering these events are “no longer fearful of adverse public relations reactions to 




constraints, themselves chose sources that seemed to swamp the administration’s line” 
(2004, p. 98-99).  
Similarly, Entman acknowledged that just because a person’s credentials say 
“press” does not mean they check their citizenship at the door. There is even evidence 
that a journalist’s claim to U.S. citizenship might help them do their job better. In 
Epkins’ qualitative project interviewing Washington, D.C.-based national security 
reporters, one participant commented, “the agencies and government authorities seem 
to trust me more than most because they know I was with them on 9/11, that I am an 
American too” (2008, p. 17). Still, scholarship overwhelmingly negates this new-found 
“freedom” from Cold War restraints, and in turn, finds strong support for indexing 
(Altheide, 2004; Bennett, 1990; Graber, 2003; Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, & 
Garland, 2004; Nacos, 2003) with many studies concluding that the media became 
foremost -- patriotic reporters -- who lost their objectivity and exhibited sensationalism, 
or at least initial blind alignment, with the U.S. government post-9/11 (Anker, 2005; 
McChesney, 2002, Reynolds & Barnett, 2003; Zelizer & Allan, 2002).  
Likewise, copious scholarship suggests that media source choice surrounding 
9/11 inhibited open discourse and discouraging alternative responses to military act on 
(Reynolds & Barnett, 2003; Lewis & Reese, 2009). Some scholars go so far as to 
accuse the media of “manipulating history to eliminate information,” “underwriting 
bipartisan support” for government’s executive branch and “abandoning their 
curiosity,” by succeeding to place America into “a ‘spiral of silence’ (Noelle-Neumann, 
1984) whereby alternative viewpoints were inhibited by perceived sanctions” (Boyd-
Barrett, 2003, p. 35, 39-40, 47; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008, p. 216). One scholar 




“the media were reflecting majority sentiments” and therefore did not cover the antiwar 
arguments available at that time (Entman, 2004, p. 161-162). 
In summary, scholarship offers substantial evidence that an unquestioned 
adoption of a government-spawned frame, such as the “War on Terror,” does not 
serve the public well. As one scholar put it, “The “war on terrorism became the 
window through which all international events were viewed;” due to President Bush’s 
us vs. them frame, the media lost its “moral imagination” so that now, this “terrorism 
frame threatens a nuanced understanding of the world” (Moeller, 2004, p. 64, 74).  
National Security Studies 
With the advent of the United States Department of Homeland Security in early 
2003, numerous sub-departments with various purposes were merged under this lone 
government agency -- 22 in all (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). It could be 
argued that because of the disparate goals of this third largest government cabine
department that scholarship thus follows. For example, many scholars have chosen to 
explore national security as it relates to national tragedy, such as Hurricane Katrina 
(Zawahri, 2007), while others examine espionage and whistle blowing (Vladeck, 2008). 
Overall, there are dozens of research streams within national securities literature and 
terrorism scholarship is but one.  
Within terrorism scholarship, some of the most promising and compelling data 
collection would certainly include the recent construction of the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), offering among other outputs, an inside glance at the inter-mix of 
terrorism, counterterrorism and the media while looking at how state actions m ght lead 
to further terrorist action. The GTD is the largest open-source database of intrnational 




However, most databases and exploratory national security studies, including 
the GTD, focus mostly on terrorist radicalization and community resilience with only a 
terse mention of the media’s role within the terrorist threat process. Even inside 
communication literature addressing the interplay of media and terrorism, scholars treat 
the label of terrorism the same as it is applied by media (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2002), 
rarely offering solutions for praxis.  
Research Questions 
RQ1: How does the Washington, D.C. national security prestige press make meaning 
of the concept of the “war on terrorism?”  
This research question identified personal journalist perceptions of the “war 
on terrorism” as a concept. This can help us to better understand the perceived media 
content influences that the prestige press draws upon when reporting on the topic of 
terrorism. Moreover, this question explored how participant meaning-making of “war 
on terrorism” may influence their professional practices overall.  
Under this question, journalists revealed the strongest influencers contributig 
toward their personal definitions of “war on terrorism,” including their personal 
experiences on 9/11, and whether they perceive reporting on terrorism as helpingto 
legitimize terrorist goals. Moreover, reporters shared insights into how they are 
attempting to achieve the delicate balances required when reporting on this sensitive 
topic.  
RQ2: How does this prestige press understand the U.S. government’s role in the 
construction and use of the “War on Terror” frame?  
This question offered a first-time glimpse at how these journalists perceiv  th  




frame. Furthermore, this question helped to ascertain how these perceptions guide their 
own news content decision-making.  
Under this question, reporters reflected on their personal post-9/11 and Iraq War 
reporting -- including lessons learned from their 9/11 reporting experiences. 
Additionally, journalists evaluated their own use of the “War on Terror” frame as a 
communication tool and offered insight into whether their self-assessment has changed 
with a decade of hindsight from post-9/11 reporting. 
RQ3: How does this prestige press understand their use of the “war on terrorism” in 
praxis?  
This question explored journalist meaning-making of the “war on terrorism” 
frame in their own work. This exploration allowed a deeper understanding of how this 
concept has influenced a decade of national security reporting and the news gatherin  
processes required for this beat. 
Reporters reflected on their frustration with the term, whether they still u e 
this frame to communicate with their audiences and their perceptions regarding future 
use of this frame. Moreover, participants discussed the power of this frame to 
influence journalist routines. 
RQ4: How does this press perceive the U.S. government rhetoric shift to “Overseas 
Contingency Operation” has influenced national security reporting? 
As an attempted recent shift in American government rhetoric, this question 
explored reporter perceptions of the evolution of the “Overseas Contingency 
Operation” as a replacement frame for the “War on Terror.” This examination provided 
an inside look at how this press views changing government rhetoric in general and 




Under this question, participants revealed their evaluation and use of the 
“Overseas Contingency Operation” as a term and assessed its relationship t  the “War 
on Terror” frame. Moreover, journalists unpacked their beliefs regarding the previous 
and current Presidential Administrations. Finally, reporters discussed whether the 





Chapter Three – Method 
Qualitative, in-depth interviewing was used as the method to address the 
dissertation’s Research Questions. Below, the advantages and disadvantages of 
choosing this method are provided. Then, a detailed account is provided of the data 
collection procedures, as well as details of the recruitment process for participants and 
the construction of the interview guide. Finally, data management and analysis 
strategies are described, as well as how research validity was secured and how ethical 
concerns were addressed.  
Rationale for Qualitative Methodology 
Qualitative research is used when a scholar desires to better understand the 
broader implications of a research question so as to place it in a social, political, r 
historical context (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Moreover, a researcher “does not provide a 
complete picture of meaning and contextual codes” simply by quantitatively 
analyzing copious amounts of data (Gitlin, 1980). More than anything, qualitative 
researchers are storytellers (Wolcott, 1994) because this methodology utilizes the 
researcher as the instrument (McCracken, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Potter, 
1996). 
Qualitative researchers describe rather than explain phenomena (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) seeking rich, vivid, contextualized accounts with a “ring of truth” (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994, p. 10). This type of research is guided by acts of questioning and 
dialogue (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Qualitative methodology is effectively applied in a 
research atmosphere with properties of constant change and blurred boundaries (Potter, 
1996) where the researcher wishes to explore a perceived situation, meaning or process




Rigorous qualitative research can be achieved in several ways. This method 
should ensure the exploration of representative concepts, not persons, because this 
kind of researcher is seeking conceptual linkages that explain or describe the m aning 
or process of a population or phenomenon being studied, not proving or determining a 
product or outcome that could offer generalizability of its participants to a larger 
population (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). During the process, the researcher should 
maintain reflexivity and give voice to participants, while focusing on a set of 
experiences that shape meaning and interpret that meaning (Denzin, 2001). 
Furthermore, the researcher should systematically interpret this meaning, usi g “thick 
description” (Geertz, 1973) where the researcher interacts with the "in vivo" (living) 
data, capturing the data with verstehen (understanding). Overall, this methodology 
seeks in-depth understanding by gathering rich, detailed examples to explain the 
“how” and “why” of the chosen topic. One of the guiding purposes for utilizing 
qualitative research is to “enter into the world of participants, to see the world from 
their perspective and in doing so make discoveries that will contribute to the 
development of empirical knowledge” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 16). 
Kvale (1995) encouraged research methods to match research questions. 
Instead of proving theory, I sought to explore and describe a unique public whom had 
not been studied extensively -- the D.C. national security press -- and to understand 
the interrelationships of this particular kind of journalist with the government, their 
editors, their sources and themselves. With the purpose of elaborating on theory, I 
employed qualitative methods to obtain rich, in-depth insights into this particularly 
complex research setting from the, often elusive and extremely busy, participant. The 




data that I have analyzed and categorized according to each of the four research 
questions. In fact, there was so much descriptive data that additional findings of note 
are also shared. Furthermore, the relationships I fostered with these participants 
allowed me to conduct an iterative research process as each reporter allowd me to 
follow-up with further questions and member checks prompted by other participant 
responses. I then utilized their answers to formulate better questions into subsequent 
interviews. Therefore, qualitative methodology served as the best tool for answering 
this study’s research questions. 
In-Depth Interviewing 
In seeking an increased understanding of how and why “from the inside” 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10), I explored first-person, deeply-held perceptions of 
the journalist. Thus, utilizing the in-depth interview was appropriate. In fact, I was 
told by reporters that they would not be willing to devote time to a survey or more 
impersonal method of inquiry because they wanted the chance to more fully explain 
their answers under IRB protection. Moreover, they would not allow observation due 
to the sensitive nature of their work. Conducting one-on-one conversations helped to 
access rich data and to build rapport, as well as allowed for working around the 
sensitive subject matter and last-minute scheduling needs of this group (McCracken, 
1998).  
Journalists could obviously relate to the interview even if it was they who 
normally served as the interviewer. In fact, it is through just such a “cooperative” 
interview experience that participants were able to give voice to their concerns and 
opinions, finding an outlet to actively engage in shaping dialogue; for such an 




interview experience also seemed to provide a positive outcome for them, both 
personally and professionally. 
Long Interviews. According to Rubin and Rubin (1995), long interviews are 
semi-structured and iterative, allowing for shared contextual meaning to naturally 
emerge. In turn, this provides vivid, detailed and nuanced data (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, 
pp.10-12). Glaser and Strauss (1967) asserted that a researcher can stop interviewi g 
once they have researched all perspectives, considered all negative cases and can reach 
saturation.  
Silke (2001) argued that interviews offer the advantage of greater flexibility, 
control and a wider context, but interviews have their disadvantages, too. Not only can 
there be participant-researcher difficulty, but there can be potential deception by the 
participant for myriad reasons; furthermore, researcher inexperience in listening and 
questioning as well as copious, unwieldy amounts of data can yield possible lower 
quality data (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Silke (2001) further cautioned that 
interviews are attached with a lack of anonymity and can fall victim to opportunity 
sampling, bias and great expense. 
Study Procedures 
Recruiting Participants and Sampling. As Rubin and Rubin argued, recruiting 
individuals with relevant, first-hand experiences and knowledge regarding the research 
questions will produce the richest and most convincing data (2005, p. 65). Therefore, 
participants were chosen from a convenience, snowball and purposive sample (Lindlof 
& Taylor, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 1995) of D.C.-based, national security journalists. 




newspaper, radio and/or TV outlets and were the first point of contact with government 
elite on matters of terrorism. 
During the recruitment process, only 27 formally-termed “national security” 
beat reporters from major outlets in D.C. were found. One reporter even emailed a 
response to the interview request where it was revealed that the study sought at least 35 
reporters, asking “Are there even 35 of us in town?” Therefore, this research opened th  
sample to interview other reporters located in Washington, D.C. who have either 
covered these topics in the recent past, were editors to the reporters interviewed or who 
currently cover tertiary beats such as homeland security/intelligence, the Whit  House 
specifically, or military affairs/the Pentagon.  
All participants included Washington, D.C.-based journalists who currently, or 
most recently, covered national security and terrorism issues for their major edia 
outlet. Therefore, all participants interviewed currently or recently held the formal title 
of “national security” reporter for their media outlet. Moreover, after datacollection 
revealed that the trade press of Washington, D.C. was often the beginning of the news 
wave where the “national security” prestige press garnered many of their story ideas, 
the six main trades (as reported by the study’s participants) were also included as 
participants. Also, reporters identified themselves as “national security beat reporters.”  
 Each media outlet, barring the trade press, has a national reach (audience) 
(without using online communications) and has a formal “national security” beat 
reporter as part of their infrastructure of journalists. All outlets were primarily English-
speaking outlets. For example, participants were drawn from a national newspaper, 




magazines based in Washington, D.C. were excluded because there was no formal, sole 
“national security” beat reporter as part of their news team.  
Newspaper, radio and television outlets were chosen because of their national 
recognition. In most cases, reporters also wrote for the outlet’s online engine, but those 
stories were normally just a shortened version of their mainstream story airing on the 
radio or TV or appearing in print. I did not find a mainstream outlet that had an online 
national security journalist specifically. In fact, in most cases, media outlets had just 
one correspondent whereas there was one outlet that employed up to 7 journalists on 
the “national security team.” In this case, I interviewed 4 reporters from that team. 
Likewise, some outlets had chosen a different formal beat name for national security 
such as Intelligence, Pentagon or Justice and some outlets with fewer staff had rotated 
in and out of the White House beat as well. In the end, the population included 11 
females and 24 males with an age range of more than 50 years.  
Each reporter was contacted by telephone or email. If the first contact was an 
email, in almost every case where they preferred to speak by phone instead of meet in 
person, we conducted most of our communication via email and first “met” by phone 
upon conducting the interview. Many times a journalist would refer me to another 
journalist. Generally, however, journalists wanted to protect their identity and did not 
want their names associated if I were to contact the journalist they referred me to; of 
course, I upheld that request in all cases and simply stated that “a D.C. journalist 
colleague suggested I contact you.”  
The recruitment process allowed for flexibility for journalists to choose the 
opportunity to conduct the interview by telephone at the recognition that, although 




might be difficult. For example, one reporter was interviewed while he was on 
assignment in the Middle East and another was on assignment in New York City. 
Furthermore, reporters were offered the option of two, half-hour sessions should their 
schedule not allow for a full time of discussion, but every interview turned into a lively 
discussion completed in one sitting – each lasting at least one hour.  
Upon direct communication, I informed participants of the nature of the study 
and their potential participation was explained. I also informed them that the study 
received IRB approval, their names and media outlets would be kept confidential 
(except to be potentially shared with my Advisor), and that their participation was 
voluntary. The email recruitment script is included in Appendix A, the IRB consent 
form in Appendix B and the interview guide is attached in Appendix C. 
 Procedure. In order to ensure an ethical, respectful interview, there were several 
precautions I took as a researcher. Most interviews were conducted in-perso  and in a 
comfortable, quiet place and time of the participant’s choosing -- such as a nearby
coffee shop during a low-traffic time or a quiet hotel lobby. In some cases, a phone 
interview was the preferable method for reporters. Each interview lasted t l ast one 
hour. A guide for questions was used, but first pre-tested with two D.C.-based reporters 
from a different beat other than national security, so I could preserve my limited access 
base.  
Prior to each interview, I demonstrated transparency by first reiterating the 
required IRB confidentiality procedures, including using pseudonyms for both the 
participant and their media outlet, keeping consent forms, transcripts and tapes in  
locked file drawer accessible only to me, and storing electronic files on a secured, non-




audiotape our conversation. Finally, I shared the study’s purpose, my background and 
interest in the topic, what I hoped to accomplish for practical application, and briefly
overviewed the interview questions. At the end of the interview participants were 
offered a copy of their consent form as well as the final copy of this research. 
During the interview itself, I stayed within the time frame promised to them, 
unless they wanted to talk more – which happened in many cases. In order to 
accomplish keeping time on track when interviews were running long, I chose to sp nd 
less time on low-priority probes and the ramp down questions at the end. I also re-
scheduled five participant interviews to accommodate their changing availability and 
was never able to catch up with one originally-planned participant due to her 
scheduling constraints. 
As a former reporter myself, I have experience in listening and questions, but 
certainly the copious amount of notes was daunting during the entire data analysis 
process. During the data collection process, I continuously tracked the large volume 
of data (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) contained in more than 875 pages of transcripts via 
field notes and observer comments on transcripts, by utilizing Word documents and 
through management of my own reflexive memos. Specifically, just before and after 
each interview, I would write a reflexive memo regarding my own biases or opinions. 
Then, I would transfer these thoughts, as well as field notes and observer comments 
written on the interview protocol itself to a dated Word document. As various 
concepts emerged over time, I began to transfer those notes to the appropriate 
document with a specific conceptual heading. Meanwhile, I color coded the emerging 
concepts inside the transcripts themselves and transferred those to the appropriate, 




to place them under the corresponding concept. Eventually, these concepts could then 
be split into categories and so forth. 
It was via reflexive memos that I reminded myself prior to each interview that 
the very act of questioning may make topics sensitive to the participant and therefore 
vocally stated to participants in the beginning of the interview that there were no 
wrong answers and I was looking forward to gleaning their personal insights -- t i  
helped allay initial participant fears (Wolcott, 1994). Moreover, I often began with ice 
breakers to make the participant feel more comfortable and ramped up with broad, 
grand tour questions. I only asked sensitive questions when the participant opened the 
door and it was necessary to the study. Furthermore, I offered each participant a 
natural environment (Rubin & Rubin, 1995) in which to have our conversation. I also 
guarded against the danger in making assumptions about participants’ meanings by 
using probes, clarification and follow up questions for greater accuracy. Finally, 
during in-person interviews, I often used facial recognition and continuous recording 
of notes to make the participant feel that they were being heard and understood, while 
ensuring their emotions were able to achieve closure by ramping down the questions 
into an easy, soft area to help round out the interview process (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2002). These steps were also taken in an attempt to avoid the participant telling me 
what they thought I wanted to hear (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 195).  
As Wolcott cautions, scholars should always remember the “paradox of 
intimacy” which can occur as the increased trust between a researcher and participant 
prohibits further (or accurate and ethical) study (1994, p. 195). If anything, I 
overcompensated for this by presenting a friendly, but “firmer than normal for me” 




background where I understood the daily reporter grind -- and in a few cases actually 
having worked with the participant prior to these interviews -- I was certainly ble to 
break the ice to make them feel comfortable speaking with me. However, during data 
analysis, I may have used a harsher, more cynical eye on their responses than I may 
have otherwise – much like a parent who teaches their child in a school atmosphere 
may be harder on their child than they would another child to ensure an ethical and 
accurate bias. I noted this in my reflexive memos. 
Furthermore, I inquired with several reporters regarding their actual news 
coverage to find evidence that supported or challenged what they shared. However, I 
felt very awkward in bringing up past stories because it seemed they felt like I was 
trying to trick them into contradicting themselves. In the end, this practice taught me, 
that for this population at least, 1) I should wait until the interview is almost over before 
introducing such material to ensure an honest, open, non-adversarial discussion (and 
did so after a few interviews of practice) and 2) In almost all cases, the point was moot 
anyway as most journalists were extremely honest and critical in their personal 
assessment of their own reporting. 
After 20 interviews, I felt the saturation point was reached, but continued data 
collection to obtain 35 interviews, ultimately confirming the saturation point had been 
reached at 20. I felt this point was reached once no new answers were offered and 
similar themes continued to emerge during each interview.  
After the interview, I either personally gave or mailed a $5.00 Starbucks gift 
card to each participant as a thank you for their time and insights. If I mailed the gift 
card, I also mailed a personal thank you note. If I gave them the gift card, I emailed 




deep respect for their time and input into my study. Most reporters replied to this 
gesture with gratitude and a statement such as “It was a pleasure to discuss the topics 
you brought up. The gift was unnecessary.” One reporter flatly emailed me that she 
could not and would not accept gifts of any kind. I also offered a copy of the final 
dissertation or abstract to each participant and plan to send each of them a copy of what 
they requested after final revisions have been made. 
Finally, I conducted member checks, both during the interview itself as well as 
afterward. During the interview and with almost every participant, my goal was to 
ensure that I accurately understood their meaning. This practice also allowed me to 
briefly stop and inquire whether a particular story, quote or colloquialism would 
identify them to others. Therefore, I reconfirmed my commitment to them tat I would 
not reveal their identity. Moreover, I conducted member checks after data analysis with 
those who had time to reply, to help me further gauge the study’s validity, including 
attempts to disconfirm my data to ensure no alternative meanings could be offered. This 
also allowed me to express my deep appreciation to participants by inviting further
feedback. If I had any question that I might, in any way, reveal a partici nt’s identity 
by revealing a specific quote, story or colloquialism that could potentially be traced 
back to that participant, I left it out entirely – even if it was important to building the 
narrative or served as evidence toward the study’s conclusions. As qualitative li erature 
suggests can occur, many participants thanked me for the opportunity to voice their 
own opinions and reflect on their own experience in an introspective manner with the 
feeling that they had contributed to research and praxis in some way (Rubin & Rubin, 




 Interview Guide. The interview guide included mostly open ended questions, 
began with an introduction and included a short explanation of the study (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Wolcott, 2001). The guide was first pre-tested 
with two D.C.-based reporters from a non-national security beat so I could preserve my 
limited participant list. As the project continued, slight adjustments in the wording of 
the interview guide helped to reduce participant confusion and provide richer results. 
The interview guide began with grand tour questions aimed at achieving 
researcher-participant rapport (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). I also utilized non-threatening 
discussion of topics such as weather, common acquaintances, and self-disclosure, to 
provide a more comfortable, transparent and inviting atmosphere. Questions continued 
to gradually increase in depth and probes were used to clarify participant meing or 
deepen understanding. Ultimately, questions decreased in intensity to mitigate 
participant vulnerability. At the close of the interview, I offered an opportunity to re-
visit anything discussed in the interview and asked if the participant could be contacted 
for further clarification, if needed. Referrals for other interviewees were also solicited.  
Specifically, the bulk of the interview guide was generally organized by 
Research Question (see Appendix B) following the literature and theory discussed in 
Chapter 2. Opening and closing questions were designed with the purpose to build 
researcher-participant rapport and to offer easy-to-answer questions that offer the 
participant a high level of confidence. Therefore, as seen in Appendix C and in the 
interest of respecting limited participant time, questions 1 and 2 utilized gran  tour 
questions to ask how the participant entered journalism, what topics they normally 
covered and what stories they were most and least proud of reporting. Questions 3-6 




personal from professional and how 9/11 may have influenced their reporting to build a
foundation for RQ3. In questions 7-16, sources, social networking and the day to day 
decisions they are faced with in covering national security and terrorism were discussed 
to better explore their perceptions of government officials/sources roles in the
construction and use of the “War on Terror” frame. These questions also explored their 
perceptions about who sets the agenda and whether they believe they are part of the 
prestige press (RQ2). Questions 17-23 explored how they perceive their use of 
terrorism concepts in praxis and what role they believe that reporters play in the 
terrorist-media exchange (RQ1). Questions 24-25 examined reporter perceptions 
regarding post-9/11 reporting, as well as how the current Presidential Administrat on 
rhetoric change from “War on Terror” to “Overseas Contingency Operation” may have 
influenced their reporting (RQ4). Question 26 was designed to smoothly, briefly ramp 
down the session and offer the journalist a chance to summarize the future of national
security reporting.  
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
For this research, all interviews were audio-taped and transcribed to allow for 
repeated listening and accurate quote collection and verification. I took copious notes 
both during and after each interview to highlight pertinent themes and to provide a 
cross-check on data interpretation. In addition, observer comments and other reflexive 
practices were incorporated to acknowledge any recognized bias as well asprovide an 
opportunity to revisit original thoughts and interpretations of meaning (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  
Grounded theory, or the “constant comparison method of analysis” (Glaser & 




collection, analysis and interpretation of data. This data analysis process det ct  
formations of patterns and themes (Wolcott, 1994).  
Strauss and Corbin (1990) argued that grounded theory more closely resembles 
reality because of its emergent, inductive process. Specifically, I engagd in three types 
of coding: open, axial and selective (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). During open coding 
procedures, I allowed the data to systematically speak in broad concepts (p. 184). For 
example, in discussing the RQ1 concept of the “war on terrorism,” reporters oftn 
communicated they felt tension within their occupation, so I applied the descriptive 
code “tension” to those statements. I continued to do this by meticulously analyzing 
data, “line by line” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 72). This process provided emerging 
categories, for example the notion of accountability, also of a broad nature. Next, I
conducted axial coding by examining the data rigorously so I could uncover, connect 
and validate relationships. Specifically, I tracked and grouped categories and potential 
subcategories along axes to discover any intersections, linkages or outliers. For 
example, the notion of accountability emerged from many participant statements when 
speaking of the various constituencies they serve. Therefore, I used the pattern code of 
“accountability” as one form of tension communicated by participants.  
Next, I utilized selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to form a narrative 
from data patterns that also had the analytic power to bind research elements together. 
For example, when the code “accountability” was found in the data, participants were 
discussing one (or more) of five specific circumstances. These included, for instance, 
perceptions of accountability to themselves as a function of their personal 9/11 
experience, to “remain true to myself in what I experienced on 9/11.” Participants 




function of audience response to their media coverage. Accountability was also 
presented as a function of access to sources or the lack there of, and as a function of 
accountability to their employer. Finally, during these conversations, reporters f en 
brought up their perceptions on accountability to the greater good due to the sensitive 
nature of their topic. Therefore, these five themes became a logical and useful basis 
for detailing research results for the reader to explain this Research Question. 
Over the course of coding, I engaged in structured theoretical sampling where 
categories emerged, collapsed and converged whereby I was able to develop 
theoretical premises and/or confirm previous theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 180). 
For example in RQ1, audience feedback did contribute to reporter’s meaning 
construction of “war on terrorism” and subsequent journalist choice/approach of “war 
on terrorism” coverage. This supports the theoretical premise that reporters tend to 
reflect the political leanings of their audiences (Cooper & Johnson, 2009). 
I utilized Miles and Huberman’s (1994) visual data display strategy to develop 
visual depictions that identified relationships among data. This process helped me to 
detect connections leading toward theory development. I cautiously abided by the 
participants’ actual words to prevent missing subtle differences in various participant 
perceptions and consciously attempted not to force data to fit existing caegories 
(Ellis, 1995). 
Interview transcripts. Each of the study’s participants granted me permission to 
audio record our conversation. Although the digital recorder was placed on the table 
between researcher and participant, each reporter seemed un-phased by the use of 
recording equipment perhaps because they, too, utilize equipment for recording 




Likewise, each interview was transcribed word for word, including vocal pauses 
such as “um” and “uh,” as I feel that even in a pause, there can be meaning. I began the 
transcribing process after conducting five interviews and personally transcribed these 
interviews myself. After the initial five, I used START fellowship fundig to hire a 
professional, confidential transcribing service. To ensure confidentiality, I took great 
care to have only one person, who had personally signed a confidentiality agreement, to 
transcribe most of the remaining interviews. Furthermore, I listened throug  the tapes 
this person transcribed to ensure accuracy. Additionally, when an interview included 
content that was controversial or highly sensitive in nature, I personally transcribed 
those remaining recordings. 
During the interview, I noted body language and repeated phrases, and for in-
person interviews, I recorded non-verbal communication of note. I also transferred 
these to the transcription after it was completed to ensure that as I coded, I did not miss 
any comments made with initial impressions or biases. If the interview was conducted 
by phone, I also recorded special mentions of participant tone of voice. Interestingly, I 
found that participants seemed to be more forthcoming by phone – perhaps because the 
phone served as a pseudo protection for them. In all cases, I recorded my own potential 
biases and any potential emerging themes as well as any questions I might need to go 
back and ask them. On several occasions and during member checks, I did use these 
notes to ask further questions.  
As soon as possible following each interview, I listened to the recordings and 
read the transcripts word-for-word to allow for best recall of their actual words and the 
context in which those words were spoken. One tape did not record at all, and to 




sentences, as well as included additional observer comments to capture the essenc of 
the context as I best remembered it.  
Transcripts yielded categories which then revealed themes. Through the 
grounded theory process of coding, often direct quotes were revealed that formed 
evidence to support overall results.  
Reliability   
The essence of qualitative research rests upon a researcher’s awareness of how 
their own biases and assumptions may influence data collection and analysis (Corb n & 
Strauss, 2008). As a researcher, I took great strides to identify and mitigate any biases 
or assumptions. Regardless, I recognize that my interpretations of the data will be 
different from other researchers who may conduct a similar study. Therefore, I 
recognize that reliability, or the measure of the extent that a study’s results could be 
generalized no matter how many times it is applied to random members of the same 
target group, is not an appropriate measure for this research. Moreover, producing a 
generalizable study is not the purpose of qualitative research. This dissertat on aimed to 
describe and provide the context for the perceptions and experiences of national 
security prestige press. Therefore, the results of this study are not generalizable to 
journalism as a whole, nor other national security journalists.  
Validity  
Researchers must protect their participants, their study and their academi  field. 
I recognize that by establishing relationships with participants, the resulting data is a 
co-construction of knowledge between the participants and the researcher that cannot 
be fully separated from those who make the constructions. Moreover, multiple 




Given that the researcher is the primary research instrument, the collection, selection, 
and interpretation of the data may be influenced with bias. Therefore, to support 
conducting a valid study, safeguards were integrated such that each of the following 
areas was achieved: craftsmanship, member checks, proper time in the field l ading to 
saturation, and researcher reflexivity. The specific strategies for employing each 
component in this study follow.  
Craftsmanship. Overall, I sought to achieve good craftsmanship through finding 
“a right interpretation” and not the right interpretation (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 240). 
To accomplish this, I turned to several scholars’ approaches to achieve validity and 
credibility as a guide for my dissertation. For example, I followed Kvale’s (1995) 
argument that validity is socially constructed and we can therefore stablish a study’s 
validity via three criteria: investigation (good craftsmanship/researcher credibility), 
communication (achieved through participant conversation and others outside the study 
to determine accuracy), and action (whether or not the study’s findings are true in 
praxis).  
To achieve researcher credibility, I prolonged my time in the field well after 
saturation was detected, recorded vivid descriptions of the interview process itself, as 
well as participant statements, and conducted member checks.  To achieve 
communication validity, I asked for insights from my advisor and other scholars 
studying this area to ensure the theoretical conclusions that I was considering were 
plausible. I also formulated and presented two conference papers overseas on this 
subject matter, revealing some of the results to garner scholarly feedback and to elicit 




validity, I investigated all potential negative cases and likely rival explanations to 
ensure I had confidence in my data.  
Moreover, I utilized a skill I had developed during my own journalism training 
when conducting interviews: prolonged silence. This is a strategy that many reporters 
utilize not only to communicate that there is no rush to giving an answer (I wanted to 
communicate that I was there to listen to them and their responses were valued), but 
also to encourage the source to fill the silence themselves. This practice can also 
promote a more honest dialogue for the interview where the interviewer is not putting 
words in the interviewee’s mouth. On many occasions, this technique resulted in the 
exposition of rich data often laden with common themes. In a few cases, I did rephrase 
the question when I sensed the reporter indicated confusion over the question. Overall, 
each journalist seemed comfortable sharing their inner perceptions, sometimes 
broaching quite controversial matters and sensitive information, during our 
conversations. This initially surprised me as I was prepared for guarded interviews 
given the nature of the topic this population covers. It was also gratifying as this 
indicated that I was receiving accurate, quality information. 
Member Checks. Validity can also be promoted via member checks, helping to 
ensure the researcher has accurately captured the participant’s voice (Kvale, 1995; 
Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Therefore, I conducted member checks 
with 20 participants to ensure proper engagement in the “art of hearing data” (Ellis, 
1995; Rubin & Rubin, 1995) by soliciting participant feedback via email and follow up 
telephone calls. Indeed, validity in this study was bolstered when participants said to 
me, “…that is the way we see it, too” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). In some cases, the 




potential solutions to some of journalism’s most pressing issues (i.e. scarce 
resources/layoffs, emerging new journalistic models, and the decline of tradition l 
journalism). Each time the participant encouraged this research to continue and made a
comment such as “you’re doing important, timely work.” 
Time in Field/Data Saturation. I feel I was able to reach a rapport level in many 
cases where it seemed that quality in the field was what mattered, not necessarily time. 
For example, I was surprised that many participants engaged in personal-level 
conversations in which I learned of recent births, deaths or illnesses in their family.  
Alternatively, I remained wary of what Kvale (1995) warned against as the 
“validity paradox,” where a researcher in seeking too much validity, ends up negating 
validity in the process. In sharing a common occupation background with participants, I 
recognized that I was in danger of assuming an understanding of their responses, and 
potentially not probing enough or clarifying when appropriate and even possibly 
creating an atmosphere where the participant wanted to please the research r. Trying to 
combat these potential realities, I stated at the forefront that there “wno right or 
wrong answers here” and forced myself to ask clarifying questions, even when I 
thought the understanding was clear. My original understanding of the participant 
answers normally matched, but this practice did, on occasion, helped clarify and 
ensured that I remained open to any alternate meanings. 
Lindlof and Taylor (2002) argue that time in the field can end for practical 
reasons, but it should end when data has quality, abundance and redundancy. 
Therefore, I ensured that all negative cases were checked and rival explanations were 
examined (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). To this end, I collected data for 10 months and 




felt a heightened confidence that the data has reached theoretical saturation (Gl ser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Reflexivity. Since the researcher is the instrument, reflexivity is crucial to valid 
scholarship (McCracken, 1998) and should illuminate the decision making points in the 
research process (Potter, 1996). There are several means to keeping oneself in check 
including memo writing, observer comments and bracketing your biases (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994) – I implemented all three techniques as well 
as interrogating myself (Lincoln & Guba, 2003). In fact, this latter practice is quite 
familiar since I have personal experience as both as an interviewee, as wll a former 
reporter/on-air personality.  
Through reflexive observer comments and memos (Miles & Huberman, 1994), I 
was not only able to closely examine my performance as a researcher, offering tips for 
improving future data collection, but I was also able to acknowledge and bracket 
turning points and personal bias to prevent losing the participant’s voice. Perhaps 
ironically, as a former reporter, I experienced the opposite difficulty of identifying too 
closely with the participant as a practitioner. This not only ran the risk of abdicating my 
role as researcher, but I also found myself supporting many of their opinions on the 
inside – sometimes I had to control myself from agreeing verbally in a manner that 
would reveal my own opinion or agreement with their statement. Had I verbalized my 
thoughts, it could have interfered with the accuracy of my results if the particint 
thought they were saying something I wanted to hear. I also recognized that I believe 
that a broad range of perspectives should be available to the public for news 
consumption, but am troubled that it seems audiences are becoming increasingly 




seeking out several sources and then making an informed decision. These experiences, 
frustrations and conclusions are also included in my memos and observer comments.  
Ethics 
I turned to Rubin and Rubin (1995) when considering ethical treatment of 
participants during the interview process. For example, I only asked sensitiv  
questions if the participant wanted to discuss the topic on a deeper level or if they 
were necessary for study meaning. I often demonstrated empathy via listening and 
asking follow up questions when a reporter spoke about difficult circumstances, many 
times centering on their 9/11 or military embed experienced. Another way I 
demonstrated empathy was to listen to reporter “confessions” regarding leaked 
information from official sources, sometimes named, and reassured them that 
information would not be revealed. It was during those interviews in particular that I 
not only felt immensely honored that they trusted me with such sensitive informatin, 
but also that I had truly achieved a level of mutual respect where I was obtaining 
honest perceptions from the participant. 
Moreover, I attempted to demonstrate transparency via a personally-customized, 
detailed explanation of our common background, as well as a candid discussion 
regarding my interests, purpose and research goals. I also offered a detailed description 
of roles and expectations during the interview process that included explaining the IRB 
consent form procedure and surrounding protections up front. I also tried to anticipate 
hot topics that could arise which might be misinterpreted by readers – likely, du  to the 
sensitivity of the topic being studied (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). 
Specifically, I clearly explained the steps taken to ensure their confidentiality, 




transcripts and any future articles or presentations; locking consent forms, tapes and 
transcripts in a file drawer only accessible to me and/or my Advisor; and filing al  
electronic documents on a secure, non-public computer (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).  In 
some cases, it was difficult to convince the participant of anonymity because with a 
small sample and geographical area to begin with, most of these journalists know one 
another.  
Finally, with this unique public in particular, and the visible sensitivity of the 
topics on which they report, scheduling and a private interview location was of prime 
concern. Therefore, I made sure to respect their timing needs and to conduct the 
interview in a private place of their choosing, or via phone. 
Institutional Review Board. This research has strictly complied with 
Institutional Review Board guidelines by obtaining informed consent and permission 
to audio record the conversation (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The 
IRB consent form also educated participants on the study’s purpose and protected 
them from deception by offering them the opportunity to ask questions, refrain from 
answering certain questions, or withdraw from the research process at any time and 
for any reason -- although no participants opted to not answer a question, nor to 
terminate the interview. IRB protocols and procedures ensured participant 
confidentiality and data security by protecting journalist identity via non-descript 
code and/or pseudonyms. Procedures also prohibited naming the participant’s media 
outlet and required storage of all files and data on a private computer not connected to 






Chapter Four – Results 
This chapter presents the results of participant interviews. Remaining aware of 
researcher biases and potential influence in the process of data collection and 
analysis, a genuine attempt was made to identify the emergence of pertinent themes 
by allowing the data to speak for themselves (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Out of 875 
pages of data, there is recognition that the choices made for supporting evidence that 
lead to theoretical development are the researcher’s own interpretations.  
Specific results are detailed below in relation to each research question 
explored. In selecting data for presentation, representative concepts (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) are offered and outlying concepts are only included if they are 
pertinent to theoretical development.1 
RQ1: How does Washington, D.C. national security prestige press make meaning of 
the concept of the “war on terrorism?”  
 Overall, participants attributed great power to the concept of the “war on 
terrorism.” This was made clear as each recounted how their meaning-making of this 
term manifested itself through their feeling of “greater accountability than before 9/11” 
to several constituencies. Therefore, the themes that arose for this question were the 
four groups to whom these participants felt accountable: 1) to themselves, 2) their 
audiences, 3) their sources and 4) their employer. An important fifth theme that arose 
was participant’s lack of feeling accountable to, what could be argued as, the dangerous 
interplay of media reporting and terrorism. For consistency, this theme is titl d 5) 
                                                
1 To preserve confidentiality, only general descriptions were used to reveal 
where in their career timeline a specific participant falls. For example, terms such as 
“young,” “up and coming” or “seasoned reporter” are used to offer the reader 





accountability to the greater good. As evidenced in the results, journalists most often 
used the word “terror,” and sometimes “War on Terror,” instead of using the phrase 
“war on terrorism.” 
Accountability to Themselves 
Several reporters regardless of age or experience, made meaning of the “war on 
terrorism” via their personal experiences stemming from 9/11 and their media coverage 
thereafter. Several journalists commented on feeling accountable to their own em tions, 
one pledging to “remain true to… what [they] experienced on 9/11.”  
Life History Influence. Most reporters pointed to either childhood upbringing or 
personal experience as one influencer on the approach they take when covering 
terrorism. For example, one participant new to reporting post-9/11, said “I view 
terrorism completely from the perspective of 9/11.” This journalist relayed that she 
realized that her youth and sole experience with terrorism was born on 9/11. Therefore, 
she said that her reporting is overwhelmingly linked to that day as a frame for “most of” 
her stories. For example, she said, “When I am writing my piece, I tend to…refer to 
9/11 throughout the story and to the emotions that were felt or recognized within 
myself…my colleagues and my audience…to connect better with them.”  
A more seasoned journalist could also articulate the deeper impact on the 
“essence” of her reporting that stemmed from her personal experience. She said,  
When I think of a definition for terror, I go for the more emotional 
impact…how I felt on the morning of 9/11 and I mean I was really, really scared 
and kind of just gobsmacked by what I was seeing…to me is the epitome of it 




Other reporters used more descriptive terms for terror like “the goblin aspect” or 
“the Joker” or “the boogie man in the alley waiting to jump out at you.” One journalist 
said, “It’s that fear that something’s going to come out at you and that’s different than 
an army some place.” Another journalist was more introspective than most and said, 
“9/11 impacted my reporting in that I give less glory to terrorists.” In most cases, 
participant’s personal experience did impact what they chose to write, or at least how 
they approached their news coverage. 
In fact, many journalists cited specific examples of how their understanding of 
terrorism changed post-9/11 and how this influenced their reporting to include “words 
that elicited the emotional side…the anger and sadness, of how we felt as a nation that 
day.” One reporter admitted, “I quickly adapted the ‘War on Terror’ outlook because 
that’s how I understood it at that point.” Later, this reporter commented,  
We are humans with emotions too; I experienced 9/11 up close so I also felt 
attacked. The audience tends to forget that…especially during a Monday 
morning quarterback session.”  
Likewise, there were a few reporters who identified the influence their 
childhood upbringing had on their reporting style and their framing choices thereafter. 
“It’s funny, I love to write narrative which is all about conflict but I’m too afraid I’m 
going to offend somebody…which comes from the way I was raised…living in a 
household where we sweep it under the rug.” However, this journalist shared that he 
was able to “adjust the frame” to feel more comfortable with his stories. For example, 
this reporter shared that he framed the use of drones by a presidential administratio  
such that he “merely showed number discrepancies” (current president has hig er rate 




saying there’s a conflict here.” This participant later admitted, “I shouldn’t allow my 
upbringing to influence the way I cover terrorism, but I can’t help it.” 
 Many of these journalists had completed military embed stints and had 
covered previous wars in which the United States was engaged. By and large, these 
reporters tended to take on a more serious tone, often lowering their voice and 
slowing their speech patterns when speaking about how they viewed the “war on 
terrorism.” One participant explained, “It is hard to objectively report on the same 
unit who is covering your back in an embed, but I think more than anyone, they 
deserve for the folks back home to know the truth about what they’re going through.” 
Another journalist expounded on his personal experiences across several wars 
including Vietnam and said, “That’s what I think makes the war on terrorism different 
you know, it’s not World War II where you could distinguish your enemy easily.”  
 A seasoned participant may have stumbled onto why an embed operation 
might open a reporter to “the humanity perspective” of things and, at the same time, 
“feed into a journalist’s need to cover conflict” in their stories to help “make their 
own personal careers.” He said, “Embeds were among the cleverest things the U.S. 
did because we were as forward leaning on the war as anybody else.  We had all sorts 
of reporters that were sitting around… waiting for the war to start.” 
 Notably, those reporters who had not completed an embedded stint with the 
military often sounded more cynical in their comments on terrorism and the military 
response in general, choosing to focus more on the political and policy side of 
terrorism and not the operational and human side that comes with sending troops into 
battle. One journalist noted, “Military embeds can ruin a reporter’s objectivity, 




Accountability to Their Audience  
 Another common theme in this research question was making meaning of this 
term as their feeling accountable to their audiences, often explained as a function of 
audience response. For almost every journalist, audience response to their coverage 
not only informed how they perceived the concept of the “war on terrorism,” but also 
played a large role in how they perceived their successfulness in relaying a national 
security story to the public -- which participants indicated also affected fu ure story 
choice.  
“It’s complicated.” Several participants expressed frustration with how national 
security issues are often quickly marred by a lack of separation by their audiences. In 
other words, “the war on terrorism is an umbrella for so many issues that different 
events are often blurred together.” One participant gave a poignant example of how his 
perception of the audience has caused him to “hate writing about interrogation 
policy…because it is either perceived as me defending the practice or vilifying people 
who did it…you can’t even write a dispassionate story about it…cause it’s all wrapped 
up together even though different things were happening at different times to different 
people.”   
 Many reporters were concerned about the potential negative emotional effect on 
their audiences stemming from what could be “a terrifying and terrible experi nc ” just 
by consuming media about terrorism. For some, this also affected what they chose to 
cover for their audience. One participant said, “9/11 was a horrible experience for most 
of this country and the last thing we want to do is make them watch more.” Another 




A lot of people also feel like there’s nothing I can really do so why watch it, I 
have enough troubles in my life. I want to come home and be entertained and 
escape from daily stress…maybe that’s why the American press is sanit zed 
more than the international press. 
Notably under this theme, reporters acknowledged that their audiences have 
communicated to them a strong displeasure towards much of their post-9/11 coverage. 
Many journalists expressed frustration with their craft and indicated personally guilt-
ridden consciences citing recognition of “an institutional-wide failure,” particularly “in 
the case of the War in Iraq, our professional stance was out of control.” Interesti gly, 
however, about half of the participants indicated feeling a “third-person effect” with 
one participant defensively stating: “It was the government who never asked the right 
questions, we just report what they do.” Still, there is vidence given by participants 
that both topic agenda-setting and terrorism frames used by the government elite are 
now evolving back into the reporter’s professional grasp. One said,  
We’ve been too focused on like listening to the government’s concerns over 
when’s the next 9/11 coming instead of actually writing intelligently about the 
culture of terrorism that seems to have evolved over the past 25 years.  
Several journalists relayed a feeling that everything was “back to normal again,” 
explaining that, with regard to framing terrorism in the news, “we’re backin power 
now -- that’s good and bad -- in that I now like have to figure out how to say “War on 
Terror” without saying it.” For example, reporters offer accounts of having to “embed 
the term” by using “more precise” phrases such as “the war in Iraq” or “in the fight 




Finally, there is evidence that audience feedback does not only contribute to 
subsequent choices made by the journalist in both story topic or allowable violence 
level as mentioned above, but also for their sourcing strategy. One reporter commented 
that “anonymous sourcing isn’t always bad since I’ve heard my audience often tell me, 
‘That usually that means you’re actually getting the scoop’.” 
 Accountability to Their Sources 
Another theme that often arose when talking about how these journalists 
viewed the “war on terrorism” was as a function of their personal risk in accessing 
sources and their accountability to those sources that “other reporters don’t have to 
deal with.”  
One reporter shared that they “saw a much more aggressive legal pursuit of 
journalists than we had ever seen before” and many were subpoenaed for various 
stories they were working, “so I typically just threw everything out.” Another reporter 
said she “was once interviewed by TSA because I had written a story about sensitive 
security information.” This risk held true for the source as well. One journalist s d, 
“The government was getting very aggressive in terms of leak investigations.” 
Another reporter lamented, “There are really no whistle-blower protections for people 
who work in national security agencies…one was fired because of what I wrote.”  
In light of these reporter perceptions of the difficulty in perfecting their final 
news product, their feeling of accountability has eerie merit. One explained, “This 
beat has to get every single thing right or there are serious repercussions… and you’re 






Accountability to Their Employer  
Many participants made meaning of the “war on terrorism” as having the pow r 
to put enmity between journalists and government officials. One reporter shard he 
equated the phrase “war on terror” with the notion of “inciting fear among reporters that 
the Administration or other agencies might declare a ‘war on my media outlet’ if my 
coverage reveals too much.” Likewise, several participants shared personal stories of 
why this term reminded them of the deep conflict they’ve seen “first hand” that can 
alter the balance between media outlets “more than ever.” In other words, reporte s 
interpreted the term as a reminder to be “on guard” to protect their job and hence, tir 
employer. One shared,  
If anything, the ‘war on terrorism’ makes me more loyal to my organization not 
just because of what we all went through together (post-9/11), but also because 
it has caused many a reporter to rethink how far they’ll go to get the story from 
the government to prevent, well, backlash in this emotionally-charged debate.  
Another reporter put the notion of feeling accountable to his employer another 
way, complaining about the “hugely competitive landscape in D.C.” and his 
organization’s lack of access comparatively in a post-9/11 era. He said sources are “ju t 
going to call you ‘cause you’re the New York Fucking Times…it must be thrilling to be 
given secret information so easily.” Other participants agreed with the assessment that 
the war on terrorism meant a “war to get the story.” For example, one journalist said 
that as a national security journalist in a post-9/11 world, “If you’re the littl  guy, you 
have to work a lot harder to make yourself relevant.”  
In many conversations, journalists were thankful not to be at odds with the 




reporter shared, “really makes me sit up and take notice.” She said, “The Obama 
administration is giving quite a push back to Fox News” while another reporter cleverly 
said, “in the ‘war on terrorism’ they’ve declared ‘war’ on a news network, so it’s like 
how do you feel if you’re Major Garrett. I mean he must feel like crap.”  
Accountability to the Greater Good  
The final theme that informed journalist meaning-making of the “war on 
terrorism” was as a function of the debated consequences resulting from the interplay 
of terrorism and media. In the course of conversation about their feelings of 
accountability to the four groups mentioned above, many times the topic turned to 
whether these participants felt accountable to the greater good of society, considering 
potential unintended harmful consequences resulting from their terrorism reporting. 
Even though several reporters acknowledged that their organizations have “held 
countless discussions” on whether their national security reporting might offer undue 
credibility to the terrorist, most participants held little concern about wheher their 
reporting would further enable terrorist goals or place people in harm’s way. In fact, 
although one journalist sarcastically said, “Yeah, I help ‘em (terrorists) sell terror,” 
most participants either denied or justified the news media’s potential influence on 
further terrorist acts or serving as a mouthpiece for terrorist messag .  
Most participants also focused their attention on the reality of the competitive 
journalistic landscape. One shared, “Well, if you didn’t report on it first there ar  
many other people who will and you’ll miss the story… I think if you can interview 
them (a terrorist), you should.” Another said,  
I mean certainly they’re doing things to get publicity and they want us to 




gets legitimizes him as a leader of a cause.  So maybe it does to some extent 
help their agenda, but that is on balance not a reason not to cover it. 
One of the more seasoned reporters dismissed the possibility of publicizing the 
terrorist agenda altogether and shared,  
What’s been interesting in the last 10 years is that publicizing the actions and 
plans of terrorists, I think it’s actually made them less attractive as people 
throughout the world have seen the brutality of their actions.  If there was a 
moment when some terrorist groups might have been perceived as freedom 
fighters for a particular cause or group of people who were oppressed, that 
moment has passed… even the sensational wears thin. 
Several others agreed with him. One participant likened terrorism to the popular TV 
show, 24, and said,  
You know al-Qaida is like 24, 24 has lost its audience and people just don’t 
view terrorism the same way they did when 24 started. It’s become mundane 
and you need an audience to keep going…al-Qaida has lost its audience 
because it’s just killed off so many innocent people, people aren’t following it 
anymore. 
Some of the more seasoned reporters termed this a “government spawned” 
“age-old notion” of helping the terrorist agenda. One journalist said,  
I don't want to sound cavalier when I say this, but I kind of don't care whether 
it does or not, so it doesn't enter into my thinking…and I think that's a bogus 
and lousy argument that government officials sometimes try to use to prevent 




In fact, several reporters leaned on their perception of serving a “larger role as 
watchdog” and seemed to view themselves in an advocacy role for the American 
public when it came to action against terrorism. One put his argument this way:  
If I tell you that the easiest way to smuggle a bomb into the country is in a 
cargo container then the government says, ‘oh I just told the terrorists how to 
do it.’  And, I guess that’s the risk but I think it’s more important to alert the 
readers to say there is this problem and you can fix it or not.  
Many participants were quick to focus on the potential good that can come from 
reporting on terrorism. One journalist said,  
I think people pay more attention and might act, might choose to do 
something differently if they know that they were, you know, beheaded and 
strung up on a bridge and set on fire.  So, as painful as some of the images 
are…around the dinner table… maybe just post it on the web and say okay if 
you want to see the actual video you know check it out here.  
A few participants found themselves stuck in their own words. One said, “I 
think that only relates to serial killers….(long pause) which I suppose is what 
terrorists are, so yeah I guess I’m part of the unfortunate, but necessary cycle.” 
Moreover, there were several journalists who had worked extensively 
overseas and explained how they felt caught in the middle of the situation of this “odd 
give and take of the media-terrorist relationship.” One reporter said,  
Terrorists don’t like us because we don’t carry the message they want us to. 
Now, journalists are a target of terrorists since Daniel Pearl. At the sam time, 
we have the direct cell number for the Taliban spokesperson who are right 




Another reporter conceded,  
We can be either enablers or debunkers and that’s where you have to be 
careful that you don’t become an enabler… I mean it’s one of the major things 
that has changed that has allowed a group of potentially scraggly nobody’s 
(terrorists) to end up, you know, international celebrities. 
In conclusion, RQ1 results indicated that journalists made meaning of the 
“war on terrorism” concept via their immediate, daily constituencies. While this 
group communicated a feeling of strong accountability to themselves, their audience, 
their sources, and their employer; when speaking about their accountability to society 
in enabling terrorist messaging, participant responses ranged from sacasm to 
disbelief with summary statements such as, “I don’t care,” “What I report is justified 
because terrorists ratings are down,” and “I hadn’t really thought about how my 
reporting might influence further terrorism.” On the whole, this group does not seem 
to acknowledge any personal power to legitimize terrorism messages via news 
reporting. 
A second conclusion from these results is that these reporters believe that the 
“war on terrorism” sentiment still impacts their daily routine. Many participants 
expressed frustration at having to find a way to present and explain terrorism news 
coverage without using such a handy “umbrella” term. To this end, most reporters said 
they “didn’t even notice the term wasn’t being used anymore (in news)…because 
really, it’s still all over the news in really some form or fashion.” 
 Finally, results indicated that reporter perceptions of their audience’s 
response matters when they subsequently choose news content. Moreover, these 




on how they treat, and are viewed by, both their sources and by government officials, 
to the point of curtailing their own behavior in order to “stay in the game.” 
RQ2: How does this prestige press understand the U.S. government’s role in the 
construction and use of the “War on Terror” frame?  
The two main themes that emerged under this research question saw the 
government’s role in the construction and use of the “War on Terror” frame as 
ubiquitous and useless. In general, participants disrespect this term, findingit carries 
many disparate meanings (ubiquitous), and provided little clarity (useless) when trying 
to communicate clearly with their audience. For both themes, journalists offered 
extremely similar comments, making this the shortest section of results. Moreover, this 
question allowed data to emerge to suggest that participants view themselves a  having 
earned their own role in marking American culture by using the “War on Terror” 
terminology.  
Ubiquitous  
Overall, journalists surmise that this term was constructed by President Bush to 
serve as “a blanket policy to make working the system easier on the government.” As 
one journalist said, “You can even tie it into freaking environmental policy for the war 
on terror.” Another agreed,  
Everything is under this umbrella now in the sense that immigration affects 
national security, drugs, space exploration, social security and healthcare affect 
national security, I mean you can’t have a healthcare system that bankrupts 
America and makes it economically unstable…susceptible to foreign ownership 




Reporters perceive the “war on terrorism” as a catchall for “all things 
terrorism,” believing not only that the term became ubiquitous in its wide spread us  to 
explain the complex matter of terrorism, but that it also came to refer to everything 
having to do with terrorism, and therefore in itself, encompassed a host of meanings, 
denoting ubiquity. 
Useless  
Overwhelmingly, journalists saw little use for the “War on Terror” as an 
explanatory term, especially at this point in time. One participant said, “I used to think I 
was communicating with my audience using that term, but now I realize that I wasn’t 
really communicating as clearly as I should have.” Another journalist agreed by saying, 
“In terms of reporting, the concept of ‘War on Terror’ is a stupid concept. It’s an ill-
defined term that is used to serve a political agenda.” Still another reporter said, “It’s a 
useless term… except in headlines and speeches.” 
Overall, participants saw this term as unhelpful, but conceded they did use the 
term at one point in their reporting. However, each reporter qualified this use by 
insisting they would “always caveat” the term by its source (in this case, President 
Bush) or by placing it in quotes. 
In conclusion, perhaps fueling participant frustration over using this 
terminology choice was what some reporters acknowledged as “our dirty role in the 
term’s promulgation.” Several journalists conceded that “using the term placed us as 
yet another conduit to help define terrorism for an entire generation.” Another reporter 
clearly expressing remorse said, “We did leave a mark on America when we chose to 
use the ‘War on Terror’ so widely.” Participants rampantly communicated a love-hate 




face of a difficult task to explain terrorism and national security policy to the public 
was also its intriguing and flexible allure. 
RQ3: How does this press perceive their use of the “war on terrorism” in praxis? 
Reporters felt that the “war on terrorism,” both as a phrase and as an action, had 
directly and profoundly impacted their daily routines. These journalists perceiv d a 
troubling dichotomy between their personal and professional use of this term, 
Regardless of their actual use of the term, participants also communicated a urrent 
debate among their colleagues regarding whether the “War on Terror” frame itself has 
died. Moreover, this term nearly always spawned a discussion regarding a new, post-
9/11 routine: increased anonymous source acceptance. Therefore, the three themes for 
this research question are dichotomy, debated and the emergence of a new jour alist 
routine.  
Dichotomy  
From the participant’s viewpoint, professionally the phrase “War on Terror” 
gave them professional freedom and increased their power to communicate with their 
audience by providing a “short-hand,” “umbrella” term for “conflict” that “made a 
great headline.” In some cases, the participants felt this term even “helped elevate 
their position in the industry,” but most reporters admitted to hiding behind the frame. 
One stated that the “’War on Terror’ gave us the power to quickly communicate with 
our audience,” and later said that “focusing on the conflict of the term and the issue, 
protected us from saying its right or its wrong...a great way to walk into it.”  
On an interpersonal level, not only did almost all reporters easily utilize the 




I use ‘War on Terror’ still because I personally don’t see a problem with it. I 
know this Administration is loathe to use the phrase… but I’m a journalist and 
I speak very fast and maybe not as politically correct as I should be but in 
terms of speaking broadly about ongoing conflicts that America is engaged in, 
it’s easier quite frankly, faster and sometimes I have to operate in rapid fire 
mode.  
Overall, reporters still use the term in personal communications, but choose to 
avoid it in their professional product. However, participants continue to internally 
negotiate how to explain the “war on terrorism” without directly stating the term. 
Debated 
Without exception, every participant somehow stated that the specific words 
of “war on terrorism” or any form of this phrase was “no longer used” in their 
reporting and claimed that at least “its heyday is over.” One reporter clarified, “my 
words are more precise now.” Another journalist shared, “we do work harder to find 
the conflict…it’s a tougher sell to the American people.” One reporter summed up 
what most said by commenting, “I only used that term when I said ‘Bush’s so called 
War on Terror’ or ‘the Bush Administration’s War on Terror’.”  
However, even though each participant denied using the actual words “war 
on terrorism” in their stories, there was copious evidence to suggest this frame lives 
on. Several participants shared the following sentiment:  “We are largely still 
reporting on the last administration…still on the ‘War on Terror’….even if we aren’t 
calling it that.” Perhaps the statement of another participant helps to explain why: 
“The ‘War on Terror’ wasn’t just propaganda, it reflected society’s heart and will just 




term may not be used now, but the policies have not changed with this 
administration” and therefore, “the framework for how we report on this topic doesn’t 
matter anyway.”  
In conclusion, these reporters do not feel that the “War on Terror” frame has 
completely died; rather it is in muddy transition. Still, these journalists largely report 
that they have failed to offer real context for this term in lieu of “the easof using it 
for quick media hits” and now realize that partially due to their collective treatm nt of 
the term, “it has now become a part of the American psyche.” Another reporter 
blatantly acknowledged, “We were instrumental in why America and really the world 
now knows what that term means at all….if there is a one-world meaning.”  
Emergence of a New Journalist Routine 
Reporters revealed a major change in journalist routine in the post-9/11, 
Washington, D.C. atmosphere that encompassed the crux of any reporter’s story – 
sources. One participant complained that after the 9/11 tragedy, “I had to revamp my 
source strategy on the whole….our access is null now that terrorism is a major issue in 
America” and attributed this change in routine to the “new, post-9/11 news gathering 
culture.” Specifically, reporters made meaning of the “War on Terror” in praxis by 
attributing its’ heavy influence over their own news content and decision-making that 
eventually “caused new journalistic routines for my beat.” 
One reporter explained why this new routine surfaced and said, “Anonymous 
sources became the norm, much more than the usual Washington culture, because the 
government threw up huge secrecy walls… we had to get in somehow.”  Another 
journalist agreed and said, “The whole issue was so closed that if we wanted a story, we 




on us and access to anyone other than Hill staffers was cut off like a beheading of our 
own.”  
While not a new practice, most journalists underscored the feeling of a routine 
change post-9/11, if not in actual practice then in greater acceptance by their editors. In 
fact, these reporters found themselves moving into the sole agenda-setting role for their 
respective news outlets. One reporter said, “After 9/11, my editor had to trust me to find 
the story…I noticed a marked difference in my leash length…whenever an editor 
wanted to change my story, even just the tone of it, I would always win the battle.”  
Moreover, these journalists were tasked with finding and choosing sources, often 
anonymous, with “little to no assistance from my editor… of course the whole DHS 
was new, so he didn’t know anyone anyway…I was the one building trusted 
relationships…a reporter is only as good as his source.”  
However, not all reporters are making the transition to this new routine. One 
reporter said he tries at all costs to get sources to go on record and explained, “You 
know you don’t want to set off a mole hunt and the reader should know that this is not 
a mole. It’s not someone who shouldn’t be giving me something they shouldn’t…this 
is a paid mouthpiece whose hiding themselves.” There is even internal bickering 
about this practice. One reporter shared that he “once heard a reporter from The New 
York Times who claimed that he never talked to anybody off the record. Yeah, 
bullshit, I don’t need it if it’s not off the record.” 
As with most routines, reporters have adjusted and several shared their “back 
pocket” strategy around the access issue for D.C.: “I can get the real scoop from Hill 
staffers because they just want to get their story out…its so competitive up there, 




“National security is such a small community that I utilize sources repeat dly…I 
suppose this is bad since it keeps the news in one place…..but there is a silent code of 
agreement to attribute anonymously on this beat.” The participant was suggestin  tha  
since it was too difficult to get real national security news on record, they continued 
to draw from the same sources for many of their stories. In other words, journalists 
seem to be constantly negotiating the battle of congressional halls vs. agency walls 
with much of the information being leaked from the U.S. Congress. 
Overall, almost every participant relayed a personal story that expounded 
upon a new post-9/11 culture in which it was “expected of reporters not to share the 
names of sources who gave information… even on ridiculous things like ‘the 
bathroom has 2 sinks’.” Still, another reporter slyly said, “Seven out of ten people 
inside D.C. can figure out who your anonymous source is anyway.” One journalist 
said this practice was so pervasive that “D.C. fashion stories used anonymous source
for opinion and gossip…it’s gotten out of hand.” But later he conceded, “I probably 
do way more anonymous sourcing than I really have to.”  Interestingly, most 
reporters said there wasn’t a rule for their outlet on this topic and they were fre  to 
decide on their own. One reporter shared that “we just got a piece of paper yesterday 
with like ethics things…I think that’s the first ever paper on how we’re supposed to 
use anonymous sources in many years.” Perhaps this is evidence that the editors have 
begun to take noticed of the increasing use of anonymous sources.  
 In conclusion, participants attribute the adoption of this new routine to a new 
environment where they now deal with a huge decrease in access to government 
agencies, documents and FOIA information. Moreover, participants report they 




editors had to trust them to get the story “at all costs including an unnamed source that 
sometimes I couldn’t even tell my boss.” In many cases, the new threat of legal action 
from heightened government investigations and the “secrecy that surrounded all things 
national security” caused reporters to “clam up at work.” This new autonomy was only 
further exacerbated by the economic downturn causing many news outlets to operate 
with a skeleton staff. In fact, most of these participants’ reported that they proffer 
unique autonomy that is “off the charts different post-9/11” in their jobs because of the 
sensitive topic they cover for their beat. One reporter said,  
I see my colleagues in D.C. working other topics that struggle with editor 
interference… I’m lucky to be on a beat in a city that is hush-hush for the 
most part so once I gain access, I’ve got it, and no one is telling me how to run 
my day or do my job.  
Another said, “I’m the one in the trenches, protecting my sources ….since this topic 
is so ‘insider,’ I choose my own story ideas for the most part.”  
Each reporter seemed to carry a certain confidence when discussing how they 
treat sources and choose stories by themselves. One stated: “It took a lot of years, but I 
finally have this topic in the bag….not everybody has a high-up contact in the 
CIA…really it’s the former government employees that are golden sources, so 
longevity on this beat matters.”  
Perhaps this confidence is one key reason why this study did not find evidence 
that media organization leadership interferes with the news gathering process for these 
particular reporters. Another possibility was shared by one journalist when he said, 




much more freedom to communicate with the audience and really without interference, 
because it’s all so much quicker now, than ever.” 
RQ4: How does this press perceive the U.S. government rhetoric shift to “Overseas 
Contingency Operation” has influenced national security reporting? 
Most participants saw this rhetoric shift as a non event. However, there were 
three themes that emerged in response to this government-led rhetoric shift. Reporters 
perceived this attempt by the Obama Administration to reframe the “War on Terror” 
as trivialized, sanitized, and strategized.  
Trivialized  
Reporters generally laughed and quickly dismissed the “Overseas 
Contingency Operation” as “trivial to my reporting” when speaking about wheher to 
use the term in their reporting. One participant said, “The choice of everyday political 
terminology is a nonevent, I’m not even sure I reported on the change.” Another said, 
“I don’t use ‘War on Terror’ because it’s so politicized, but I don’t use ‘Overseas 
Contingency Operation’ because it’s so stupid.” Still another maintained that the 
“’Overseas Contingency Operation’ feels detached…almost boring now, pulls the 
emotion out.”  
A common notion offered by many of the reporters centered on while they 
heard about this rhetoric change, they felt it was “an attempt to trivialize the war” and 
“a smokescreen, just another political dance.” One reporter explained,  
I think that was part of the Obama project making a break with the Bush 
Administration. And, you know I have reported a lot I think on how the 
rhetoric and imagery of the Obama Administration on national security issues 




Other reporters expressed anger about the change that “almost makes fun of the 
war” by making statements such as,  
It’s not a contingency operation, we have 200,000 fucking troops 
deployed…this is an ongoing conflict…we’re not jumping into hot spots and 
getting out, that’s what overseas contingency operation means, literally.  
Another journalist believed that “’Overseas Contingency Operation’ equals ‘Counter 
Insurgency Lite’.” 
Sanitized 
Overall, reporters felt the term “Overseas Contingency Operation” has helped 
to sanitize the fear-inducing “War on Terror” phrase to the point where it has even 
altered both their occupation and their story topic choices. One journalist simply aid, 
“Well, it has influenced my reporting – I don’t report much on terror anymore.” An 
older journalist relayed,  
Let me put it this way, our organization has had countless conversations about 
how to use or not use and the implications of using, the phrase ‘War on 
Terror’ but we haven’t had even one conversation on how to use the phrase, 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation’…because no one in their right mind is ever 
going to say a clunky phrase like that in the media.  
Another reporter emphatically said, “America understood what the global war on 
terror is or was. If you start talking about overseas contingency operation, some guy 
sitting at home with a beer in Nebraska is going to bash his head.” Another reporter 
agreed, “In TV we’re taught don’t use something higher than what a fourth grader 




Some journalists thought that not only did President Obama sanitize the term 
“War on Terror,” but that the press often sanitizes what the administration does. One 
journalist said, “The press sanitizes Obama every day.” She continued,  
Obama comes in and says we’re going to close Gitmo by a certain date and 
then doesn’t, right? If that was George Bush, could you just imagine the 
howling and the screaming by not only the U.S. press but by the international 
press...the Obama Administration’s toned down rhetoric has done its job.  
That said, this same reporter conjectured that another reason why President Obama 
may not be feeling the heat like President Bush may have is that the last elction 
“happened to coincide with major layoffs in the news industry, so there aren’t enough 
bodies to be on top of it now.” 
Strategized 
Meanwhile, most journalists focused on the strategy behind the rhetoric shift. 
One journalist said, “The ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ seems to work better 
with other world powers than the ‘War on Terror’.” However, most reporters felt that 
the rhetoric shift was a “blatant strategic move to reframe the debate” as one that is 
occurring abroad in order to detract from the issue happening here at home. One 
participant succinctly shared: “I feel like the breaks were slammed on, the issue 
moved overseas and the urgency slowed to a crawl.”  
In speaking of political strategy, many journalists shared their view of the 
former and current presidential administration. Overwhelmingly, when tis group was 
speaking about President Bush, they commented on his “divisive nature that pitted 
America against the world” within an administration “laden with conflict.” 




“hope” and “peace” and discussed his drive to “[bring America] on equal footing with 
other countries.” For example, one journalist said, “He seems to see terrorism as a 
pursuit of common interests around the world.”  
Finally, one journalist pointed to a more recent strategic attempt by the Whit  
House to again reframe language regarding terrorism given the “Overseas 
Contingency Operation” has not picked up traction in the press. He said since the 
“OCO didn’t seem to catch on… the Obama administration has tried it again with 
‘war on al Qaida’.” An older reporter felt that while “Obama was smart to reframe 
it… the ‘war on al Qaida’ is giving more publicity to the enemy” in the end.  
 In conclusion, the “Overseas Contingency Operation” has not replaced the 
“War on Terror” frame and, is largely disrespected as a term. However, these 
journalists perceive a continuation of the “War on Terror” frame, not only in their 
continued reporting on the past administration as well as the new administration’s 
unchanged policies, but also as immediately salient to these reporter’s daily 
consideration of how best to communicate about national security to their audience. 
Moreover, there is evidence that a journalist’s view of the current administration 
personality may contribute to the frame that reporter’s choose when building news 
content. For example, whether deserved or not, the Bush Administration was seen as 
“laden with conflict” and therefore when reporters spoke about terrorism, they often 
framed this era as “America entering into a conflict of interests.” Whereas with the 
Obama Administration, these reporters seem to attribute hope and change to this new







In the course of data collection, additional notable findings emerged. These 
results offered a better understanding of how participants perceive the current state of 
national security reporting overall and how they view their role as a member of the 
D.C. national security press corps. Findings will be explained under the following 
themes: Journalist use of new technologies, terrorist use of new technologies, 
implications of new technologies, and the future of national security reporting. 
Additionally, one reporter shared such a compelling theory/narrative on why the news 
culture is changing so rapidly, and felt so strongly that her theory was the reason for the 
coming “death of the prestige press,” that her thoughts are briefly included toward the 
end of this chapter under the heading, “One Reporter’s Theory.” Finally, reporters 
shared perceptions on whether or not they felt they were part of the prestige press. 
Surprisingly, there is evidence that in many cases, framing begins with the small, trade 
publications. These findings conclude Chapter Four under the theme, “We are 
Different.” 
  Journalist Use of New Technologies 
 Journalist use of new technologies in their daily work is pervasive in many 
cases and null in others, but in every case reporters have emerging technologies on 
their minds. Age was the largest factor in determining the proclivity to employ new 
technologies, where younger reporters tended to utilize many forms of Internet 
communication including Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn. One journalist boasted, “I 
used LinkedIn to cultivate relationships and sources because it brings credibility to 
my stature.” Another reporter said, “I know a guy at XXX who got a worldwide 




and what was going to happen next.” Still another reporter said, “Robert Gibbs, the 
White House Press Secretary tweets, so I’ve got to pay attention to that.  
The older reporters, in general, shied away from engaging in this new routine 
– particularly if they had been with the same outlet for many years. One participant 
said, “A tweet does not meet the traditional threshold, how do you verify that the 
person is who they say they are?” However, there were several who branched out into
the digital world cautiously. One participant said, “I have a pseudonym on Facebook. 
I don’t want people finding me or my sources…the FBI doesn’t need a warrant to go 
on Facebook.” An older, well-connected reporter said, “I don’t feel like I need to do 
that (use the Internet to connect to others). I feel like foreign policy and the players in 
the U.S. government, it’s fairly evident who they are and I know them.” 
Many participants expressed shock and consternation at the way our new 
technologies have affected journalism overall. One reporter illustrated this emotion 
by saying,  
I’ll never forget this, there was on the front page of The Wall Street Journal, a 
picture of a young woman who was shot and became the iconic image of the 
riots, and underneath it the caption said, ‘in this unverified photo.’ I thought to 
myself this is really a remarkable change that The Wall Street Journal would 
acknowledge an unverified photo on the front page which they certainly got 
off of You Tube. 
Another common perception for reporters left them feeling “simply forced to 
comply” with the new technologies available. “It’s constant deadlines because if 
someone is looking at the Internet it doesn’t matter what time it is, they’ll look at 




participant said, “Anybody’s got a blog. If there’s news coming our of the White 
House it doesn’t hold for five minutes and within 2 hours it’s old…I have to read the 
blogs.” 
Many shared in various ways that they felt their work load “had increased at 
least three fold” with the need to adapt to the constant flow of communication. One 
participant noted that “it makes the job for traditional journalists harder becaus  you 
have to wade through a lot more disinformation now….there’s a lot more false leads 
to run down which consumes time on writing a better piece.” Another journalist is 
disgusted with his blogger interactions explaining, “They can be parasitical where
you know they’re taking our reporting and using it for their own ends and not doing 
their own reporting.” 
Sometimes, journalist use of social networking “backfired.” One reporter said,  
My Facebook page has become much more like for friends although there are 
professional acquaintances there too and I don’t know how to separate them. 
There’s a story I put on Facebook and my sources said ‘great piece,’ but my 
friends were like, ‘great piece, faggot’ and I’m like ‘damn you’.  
In fact, this type of story was very common among participants who utilize Facebook. 
Still, most reporters acknowledge and appreciate the rapidly changing power 
dynamic that stems from the digital age. One lamented, “Certainly the big news 
organizations no longer control the narrative. The narrative is now controlled by the
cloud, you know the interconnected web we all exist in.” However, the youngest 
participant in this population shared, “I rely heavily on the web for my reporting 
generally….and people my age tend to trust the Internet more…but I’ve never writt n 




new generation of journalists, the importance of face-to-face communication is n t 
lost yet. 
Terrorist Use of New Technologies  
Another subject area that arose was terrorist use of new technologies, 
specifically the Internet. Most participants agreed that it does affect journalist work. 
In fact, most of them relayed that they cover all al-Qaida video messages in some 
form or fashion, even if it’s simply on their media outlet website or blog. One 
reporter explained,  
The increased use of the Internet by terrorist groups has made monitoring and 
access much easier, at the same time it lessens the sensational, the shock 
value, because everyone can access it now. The press doesn’t have something 
unique anymore. 
On the specific topic of beheadings, one journalist commented that reporting 
should “always remain in context…since I don’t see like millions of people being 
beheaded, I’m not sure what people can learn from seeing that now.” He continued, 
“The beheading phenomenon seems to have passed. Or, maybe it’s lost its appeal and 
just isn’t covered inside our echo chamber anymore.” 
Another put the changing relationship manifesting itself via increased Internet 
use by terrorists as “a game changer,” positing from his recent overseas experience 
that “the enemy doesn’t need the media anymore or to set up a TV appearance, 
because they’ve got the Internet. I think they’re being even more effective on th  
Internet.” 
The most recent press that terrorists have garnered is largely about their 




for terrorists…people are being brought together who never would have met 
otherwise.” Another participant commented, “Now, terrorist organizations can come 
out of nowhere and get these people radicalized just by looking at some Internet 
videos in a matter of months instead of years.”  
In a recent National Public Radio report, reporter Dina Temple-Raston (2010) 
terms this “different brand of terrorism that’s much harder to recognize and much 
harder to fight” as “jihad lite.” In her report, she asserts that the attempted car 
bombing in Times Square alerted counterterrorism officials to a growing problem; 
namely, the speeds with which people in America have been radicalized. Her sources
told her that it used to take years to indoctrinate and train would-be attackers, but now 
it takes only months or even weeks. For example, Connecticut resident Faisal 
Shahzad, New York’s Times Square bomber, went from financial analyst to alleged 
terrorist in just a matter of months.  
While it’s no secret terrorists use the Web for recruitment, one reporter said 
that “what is interesting is that this medium, while more ubiquitous and reaching 
more potential jihad followers, creates shallow followers who need getaway cars and 
are not willing to die for the cause.” 
Implications of New Technologies 
Participants shared a heavy burden for how the changing economy and the 
introduction of new technologies are affecting their occupations. The frustration of 
participants was expressed best by one journalist’s emphatic reply to the question 
posed: “Have these changes affected you at all?” to which he replied, “Yah, I’m 
fucking unemployed.” His position had been let go the week prior to our interview. 




It’s brutal out here…The Post is laying people off. The Times (Washington) is 
probably about to lay off 40% of its staff. The New York Times has been 
retrenching. And all the papers have been closing Washington Bureaus or 
merging them….and look what’s happened to the Tribune papers.  
Using the Homeland Security Advisory System coding as a frame, one participant put 
it this way: “We’re at Defcon One and using the color-coding system, we’re probably 
looking yellow right now.”  
 Although many reasons for these news cutbacks were offered within 
discussions, most blamed the poor business models of journalism and the decline of 
traditional routines. One journalist said, “They didn’t charge for online content and 
now I have so many colleagues out of work simply because they can’t sustain 
traditional journalism anymore.” Another participant stated,  
Inflammatory things that are said online by people who don’t stop to think 
about these issues…you could take the best reporter in the world and their 
blog would still not be as good as their reporting because no one is editing it. 
An older journalist confidently diagnosed the problem and explained,  
The problem is ubiquitous communication…it’s difficult to get a scoop on 
anything. The flow of information is uncontrollable. Twenty years ago people 
knew the difference between the Wall Street Journal and the National 
Enquirer and now they don’t….everything becomes a shout fest and no one 
believes anything anymore.  
Still another participant revealed that “we just don’t have the patience or time 
anymore to backtrack like we should our sources and we rush to air with half-sourced 




encouraged “freak out stories” where reporters are asked to “insinuate there is a 
terrorist threat when there really isn’t any evidence of one.”  
 Likewise, some journalists lamented that it’s not just a lack of time, but a lack 
of depth that is now plaguing the industry. One said, “We don’t cast our net as wide 
anymore. There is very little investigative, in-depth reporting now and at the sam  
time we’re fixated on like 3 stories, instead of the 30 we used to.”   
 However, there were reporters who could also see positive implications of the 
new technology landscape. One journalist said, “In many ways it’s the 
democratization of journalism. It’s good that everyone has a voice and it’s bad 
because everyone has a voice.” Another journalist explained,  
The fundamental thing that has changed in journalism is the monopoly of 
information is no longer exclusive and has given way to a proliferation of 
different styles, reporters, organizations and sources…it’s given life to a 
different global social conscience. 
Another young reporter said new technologies made for stronger communication.  
The distance between reporters and viewers has gotten a lot smaller. So, 
people have more access to you…they feel a degree of intimacy with you and 
share things with you. If this were 15-20 years ago, you only saw a reporter on 
TV and if you wanted to send that reporter a message, you’d have to call 
headquarters in New York, send them a postcard and like six months later 
they don’t even remember the story. Now, by the time you’re off the air, 




This participant quickly followed up with a prediction. “Who knows? Maybe in 
another 15 years time, the director of the FBI will actually start giving you secrets on 
the Internet on his anonymous blog that he developed.” 
 At the end of the day, most reporters lamented that the main casualties, other 
than jobs, are national security and foreign coverage. One quipped, “And Americans 
are dumber for it.” Another reporter said the result of this landscape is,  
We don’t have anybody at the CIA everyday anymore…I’m not saying that’s 
where the documents came from I just mentioned, but you’re going to miss 
important stuff if nobody’s there. We’re losing expertise. 
Future of National Security Reporting  
More than anything, reporters are concerned about a secure future for national 
security journalism. These concerns centered on the increasing digital age, failing 
business models of journalism, and whether national security topics are still relevant. 
One participant said,  
It’s going to be much harder to protect the sources that we have because in the 
electronic age there are a lot more ways to leave trails and tracks and I don’t 
think that bodes well at all for national security reporting…national security 
takes time and money and I think bloggers have time and money.  
Another participant said, “It’s just going to end up being The Times (New York) and 
the wires and maybe the Wall Street Journal.” A third reporter staunchly said, “You 
can’t cover national security matters with a 140 character tweet….that said in this 
economy, I think we’re going to see more and more people covering national security 




Overwhelmingly, 30 of the 35 interviews mentioned Pro Publica (a new, 
independent, non-profit online newsroom that claims to produce investigative 
journalism in the public interest) as the new wave of journalism for the future, many 
reporters admitting that they “didn’t think they would succeed.” One participant 
summed up their new online presence by saying, “Pro Publica has had the biggest 
impact since publishing paid traditional media.” Another journalist said, “It seem  
that the private or nonprofit route is the avenue to go down and it could help bulk up 
national security reporting.” 
In the end, participants not only predicted a downward turn of national 
security reporting, but of “good reporting.” Many of the seasoned reporters p edicted 
that new media technologies, while convenient and productive, were so ubiquitous 
that they “would eventually be the demise of the press as we once knew it.” In fact, 
they purport that the downward spiral has already begun. 
One seasoned reporter equated online journalism to “bad reporting in general” 
and said, “I’m just concerned if nobody is reading newspapers, they’re not going to 
read these long articles on a website either.” Another participant agreed that “blogs 
have shifted the media landscape in terms of integrating opinion with fact and it’s 
tough to discern where the line is anymore….I fear that the fact-telling, truth-bearing 
press won’t be here much longer.” 
Several reporters were concerned about the recent emergence of “Guerilla 
Leakers” such as Wikileaks, calling it “an online giant with an agenda.” One 
participant said, 
People will find a way to use the Internet for their advantage and in some 




bigger questions that should be asked…and a backstop, whereas Assange (the 
founder of Wikileaks) does not. 
Another reporter said, “This is the future… people no longer have to find a trusted 
journalist to protect their information and present it in a thoughtful way they can just 
dump it out themselves…Wikileaks totally changes the power dynamic. 
Other participants pointed to the bleak future of national security reporting 
given the new movement toward online citizen journalism and said, “Journalism is 
changing and now citizen journalism is everywhere…I mean look what happened in 
Mumbai. The only information coming out of there was from citizen journalists.” 
Other journalists are more skeptical of this new practice arguing,  
CNN has that ‘I report’ thing and they frame it as a traditional quote using the 
same anchor voice from the normal news but it’s what they got from a Twitter 
viewer….that may save money but it seems misleading at the very least, and 
ironically, it’s just adding to our own demise. 
One Reporter’s Theory 
“It all started with soccer trophies.” One seasoned reporter had an especially 
compelling theory about the reason why the prestige press is dying given the 
mentality of the upcoming generation of social media gurus who “often stay in heir 
basements to talk to friends.” She believes that these “kids were all given soccer
trophies whether they won or lost the game,” so the Internet generation has a sense of 
entitlement and lack of personal accountability that is further magnified by the 
inherent anonymity that the online world provides. She explained,  
They are just encouraged to speak their mind whatever the consequence and 




platform I have on the Internet but the difference is I made 25 phone calls and 
have been doing this nonstop for years and they have opinions based on 
vapor…this gets back to the prestige press and why our standards might be 
lowering.  
Then, after talking about potential reasons for the recent trend of women 
suicide bombers, she said, “You know if I ever get Jihad Jane to sit down with me, 
I’ll ask her if she ever got one (a soccer trophy).” 
In conclusion, while there is evidence that both younger and older reporters 
can see positive outcomes of the new digital age, such as increased audience 
feedback, only the older journalists articulated negative concerns. These include the 
threat of “losing the mainstream press as we know it,” future generations of enjoying 
online anonymity “which may breed a further sense of entitlement for the younger 
generation” and from a cultural perspective, losing Americans to seek online only 
what fits into their belief system (or to fit busy schedules to read shorter online 
articles) to encourage a culture where we are, as Neil Postman (1985) once wr te, 
“Amusing Ourselves to Death.”  
Moreover, there was a clear demarcation between younger and older reporters 
as far as personal use of the Internet for social networking purposes, including 
building a source list online, reading blogs and engaging with others via various 
online platforms. The younger journalists are using new technologies to develop 
sources, whereas the older journalists already have personal source relationships with 
the same people the younger journalists are “trying to hook.” 
In an age of a diverging American population seeking information consistent 




segments of people, relying on culture mores and political and historical myths in 
contextualizing international events” (Powers& el Nawawy, 2009, p. 267), the older 
participants are concerned that the increasingly polarized media choices are only 
“further exacerbated by the next generation of Internet-savvy users expressing 
themselves void from a meaningful return of responsible dialogue” – perhaps 
encouraged by their soccer trophies on the shelf just behind their computer. As one 
participant lamented, “Once the Internet generation become editors of our papers, the 
press as we know it now will be dead.” 
In summarizing their comments on the recently increased terrorist use of the 
Web and its affect on these national security journalists, reporters generally feel that it 
is harder for their outlet to find unique news now because anyone can find news 
online from terrorists. This has contributed to their choosing to cover other national 
security-related stories. One journalist notes: “If I could break that news, I might still 
be covering that stuff.” Even though it seems that journalists are increasingly using 
terrorists as sources, terrorists themselves do not seem to be seeking out the 
mainstream media as they once did, in order to promulgate their messaging. Instead, 
these reporters say they are now often forced into quoting terrorists as sources online, 
as various terror groups are “getting better at leveraging the Web for their own 
purposes.” 
While the Internet has proven an effective medium for terrorists to tout 
strategic messaging and begin to proselytize others into a particular ideology, there 
are also perceptions that these fast followers are not as indoctrinated into rad cal
ideology; second they are more willing to tell authorities pertinent information on 




tool in planning and operations. As evidenced in most, if not all cases, would-be 
terrorists such as Faisal Shahzad (the NY Times Square bomber) -- while invited via 
Internet -- still had to travel to Pakistan for training. Therefore, while the Internet’s 
advantage of stealth seems all but insurmountable, at some point would-be 
perpetrators must ultimately emerge from the basement, according to participants.   
We Are Different 
Another finding of note surrounded the acute awareness of participants of 
their inclusion within a “special” group – the national security prestige press of 
Washington, D.C. Although the term “prestige press” was never offered by a 
participant, almost every reporter communicated their involvement in this group 
based on the two criteria for prestige press: 1) instances of their stories re-circulating 
in other published press, even worldwide, and 2) direct access to government elites 
that other members of the press do not have. 
In fact, reporter perceptions of whether they included themselves as part of the 
prestige press or not, went far beyond the two requirements of elite access and 
beginning the news wave. Often, the phrase “we are different” came up in 
conversation. For example, one journalist called their work “a higher stakes beat” that 
was “certainly more important because it involves matters of life and death” and 
“carries more pressure” than other beats. Another summed it up by saying, “In our
beat, you only get one shot at it.”  
When asked directly whether this they thought they were a part of a 
prestigious group, one journalist said, “Yes, I’m the first point of contact to the 




but our outlet is prestigious and looked to for up-to-date national security news.” 
Surprisingly to me, one reporter was even more emphatic about this point arguing,  
I do play a very influential role…I believe the story I wrote on XXX (cannot 
reveal topic because reader could identify participant) raised the issue in the 
press…99% of what the public knows about national security is from the 
media.  
Another reporter felt quite differently and was initially reluctant to admit he was part 
of the prestige press saying, “I don’t think I am part of that group” but after reflecting 
out loud about other journalists who had “ripped off my story for the world to see,” 
this particular participant recanted saying,  
Yeah…while we watch out for everyone else’s agendas, because everyone has 
one, I guess I’d say I’m part of that group, the group that helps determine 
what America will think about that day…we do compete with others in the 
prestige press space. 
Another reason these reporters believe the national security resides in a 
different arena is because of its origination. One journalist said, “My beat exists 
because of 9/11” and “I owe my job to Osama bin Laden.” Similarly, another reporter 
said,  
A few years ago I was told that this is the golden age of reporting. In the 90’s 
you couldn’t get on A-1 with a national security story to save your life. 
Obviously, that’s changed. I think it’s probably seen its peak. It’s become 
institutionalized now. There was a huge department at every news outlet. 
Several shared some of the positives to covering national security saying, “We’re 




varied.” Several reporters expressed humility, though. One ended the conversation by 
saying, “I do feel like we are on a different level, but maybe that’s just pure hubris.” 
In general, these journalists feel their beat is not only different, but also more 
difficult to cover than others. Themes that emerged when discussing the challenges of 
this particularly beat included issues of access, process, sacrifice, risk, and location. 
Access. Many participants saw their role in this beat as more difficult because 
of the unique access issues they experience and the heavy source development 
required. One reporter said, “ It is much more difficult to cover in terms of 
developing sources…people are more reluctant to talk to you than let’s say covering 
the airline beat.” Most reporters not only talk about the “sources who all of the 
sudden have a foot in their mouth” but also “FOIA requests are way more difficult in 
this arena with a ton more exceptions.”   
On the whole, reporters did not seem put off by this hurdle and often spoke of 
access constraints from the viewpoint of their sources. One reporter said,  
As a new issue (terrorism) in America, people in the national security field ar  
rightly hesitant to talk to reporters because one, they’re afraid of divulging 
information they could go to jail over, or two, they don’t have a lot of 
experience working with reporters.  
Overall, these reporters perceive their access issues to be much more difficult
than other beats in D.C. and are continuously striving to overcome this challenge. 
Process. Another theme under why these reporters feel their beat is tougher to 
cover is the notion that their news gathering process is more complex than other 
beats. One reporter said, “Covering national security is a patchwork process unlike 




are fallible so piece-mealing the story together is a key skill for the national security 
reporter.” One reporter shared that he thought the national security beat was 
“distinguished from others reporters” because  
Much of what we deal with is classified, in fact probably almost all of it…so 
we have to construct what we know from many different memories and you 
have to fight literally for every word in every sentence. It’s a taxing process. 
In the end, when participants compare national security to other beats, many 
pinpoint the actual news building process as more cumbersome, requiring “a perfect
memory, or else.”  
 Sacrifice. On another, more personal level, this group shared stories of trying to 
remain immune and emotionally-detached to the horrors of what they saw, 
particularly at the Pentagon, many times unsuccessfully, and how this sacrifice sets 
them apart from other beats as well. Many participants had a personal story about 
how 9/11 affected not only their coverage, but their outlook on life in general. They 
each were required to closely confront the damage and aftermath of 9/11, which has, 
in turn, induced heavy personal feelings. Some even seem to have a martyr syndrome 
confiding, “the public has no idea the sacrifices we make…we are definitely first 
responders and unsung heroes.” Another participant said, “one of the pictures I keep 
in my office is of like three days after the event when they put the two big light 
towers up…9/11 fundamentally moved and changed me…others went back to their 
normal lives, mine never did.” Along the lines of sacrifice, many reporters said they 
chose not to vote and some claimed “this is a sacrifice for me not to participate in 




Risk. The notion of risk was often brought up in context of how reporter’s 
viewed their jobs as different from other beats. One type of risk often mentioned wer  
the increased legal ramifications these reporters and their sources face. One journalist 
shared his “after-interview strategy” and said, “I don’t keep any paper trails anymore. 
The Administration is really cracking down on investigating sources and terrorism 
information they read in the paper.” 
Of course, many reporters also mentioned the physical risk when meeting a 
terrorist or a shady source for an interview. One said, “I have to think very carefully 
about where I’m going….where the way out is. I will not let people take me in their 
cars to other events…I rent a car.”  
Another reporter shared her plan of getting away from a terrorist while being
driven back to her hotel saying, “I had it all planned out. I was going to throw what I 
had in my arms at him and dive out of the car.” These reporters say this type of 
concern is unique to their beat and makes for a “higher stress job” on top of the 
normal reporter deadline stresses. 
Location. Some reporters focused on the locale of the national security beat 
and claimed their topic is different because “you can only do the job effectively in 
D.C….people don’t want to talk on the phone or email, you have to meet them in 
person with this kind of information.” “Another reporter said, “You have to be in 
there everyday. You can’t really observe security from a distance.” One journalist had 
a different perspective on this reality, however, saying “More than other places, there 
is the challenge of breaking out of the pack here -- especially in national security.”  
The location of national security news within the broader context of news was 




other beats because “it often envelopes the rest of the beats across the United States” 
in that America’s culture of news “lends itself to the seductive tendency to cas  issues 
as national security issues in order to emphasize their importance.” Perhaps in many 
ways, the beat’s differences are also ironically its inherent dangers. 
Finally, the location of many initial stories resides with the smaller trade press 
covering national security in Washington, D.C. More than two-thirds of those 
interviewed discussed the impact of trade story choice on their own topic choices for 
follow-on stories. One journalist summed the comments well by saying, “I’ve writt n 
them off relentlessly. And considering what they’re paid, those guys are really pretty 
good.” When I told several participants that those I had interviewed in the national 
security trade press did not think they were part of the prestige press that helps to 
begin the media wave in D.C. for story topic cycles, one chided, “Well, they’re not 
reading my stories then.”  
 In conclusion, these journalists are sharing that while the “War on Terror” was 
used in their reporting, it was highly disrespected as a term. Everyone rememb rs the 
days when that frame was “rampantly used by government and press” but almost all 
participants insisted they utilized qualifiers of the term from the beginning of use. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that the “Overseas Contingency Operation” is a failed 
attempted frame that also has little respect among these journalists. Moreover, the 
“War on Terror” lives on in journalist perceptions because nothing else has 
successfully taken its place. This is not only evidenced by their frequent use of “War 
on Terror” throughout our conversations, but also in the frustrations of having “to 




 Secondly, these reporters (minus the trade press) do view themselves as 
prestige press, although never using that terminology, insofar as attributing the r 
special access to government elites as “prestigious.” One reporter summed up many 
participant statements by saying, “We have the best access to the White Hous  and 
other high-up government officials when other reporters don’t, so it makes me feel 
important, yeah.” While government access is one necessary ingredient for the 
establishment of a prestige press, the domino effect where news is then copied to 
other press around the world is another ingredient. However, many journalists do not 
seem to make the connection to their potential influence on the rest of the world’s 
press, but rather focus on the “echo chamber here in D.C.” where “my print story is 
then re-created in TV format and then I’m brought on to talk about the story” or 
frustrations that “my story is ripped off by D.C. bloggers all the time…and who 
knows where that ends up.” 
Finally, and perhaps ironically, it seems the trade press are, in many cases, the 
actual beginning of the media wave -- without even realizing their role in this 
process. With nearly all study participants pinpointing the D.C. trades as the place 
where they begin the news building process for many of their own terrorism stories, 
the trade reporters, also interviewed in this dissertation, do not recognize their pow r 
to frame stories as the very first point of contact with senior government officials on 
Capitol Hill. These stories, via the mainstream national prestige press, can then be 








Chapter Five – Discussion 
This chapter provides a discussion of theoretical connections and implications 
emerging from participant interviews. Limitations of this research are discussed and 
conclusions offered based on careful data analysis. Future research streams are lso
suggested.  
This study explored how the Washington, D.C. prestige press made meaning 
of the concept of the “war on terrorism,” how they understand the government’s role 
in the construction and use of the “War on Terror” frame, how this population 
understands their use of “war on terrorism” in praxis and how they perceive and 
employ the Obama administration’s recently attempted rhetoric shift from “War on 
Terror” to “Overseas Contingency Operation.” Study results have yielded a b tter 
understanding of national security reporting in a post-9/11 world and uncovered the 
insider’s viewpoint. 
I conducted 35 in-depth interviews with D.C.-based national security reporters 
by utilizing a snowball sample. Study results indicated that there was importance in 
examining the post-9/11 news gathering process for this unique group of national 
security journalists in Washington, D.C. Among other findings, new patterns of 
routine and technology use were revealed for these participants that are rooted in 
post-9/11 realities. Moreover, evidence was found for an expansion of framing theory 
and the need to reconsider the hierarchy of influences model as applicable to a post-
9/11 era. 
Stemming from the research questions, journalists made meaning of the “war 




and their employer. Moreover, this group denies having the power to legitimize 
terrorism messages from news reporting.  
Additionally, reporters believe that the “war on terrorism” lives on, not only in 
the current Administration’s unchanged policies, but also by impacting their daily 
routine in several ways: First, this group reveals their daily struggle to cr ate their 
own “War on Terror” frames when creating news content, now that the term itself is 
taboo – many wonder what will “catch on” next. Second, journalists reveal that the 
national security beat requires close personal monitoring of their own behavior when 
relating to the presidential administration in order to “stay in the game.” Additionally, 
journalists report that the post-9/11 era has produced a new journalist routine of 
increased anonymous source acceptance helping to lead to an increased perception of 
autonomy. 
Finally, reporters reveal great remorse when assessing their role in help ng to 
promulgate the “War on Terror” concept and readily acknowledge their part in 
helping to support the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is also evidence that a 
journalist’s view of the current presidential administration personality may contribute 
to the frame that reporter’s choose when building terrorism news content ad that the 
hierarchy of influences model needs updating in a post-9/11 world. Furthermore, 
there is evidence to suggest that the D.C.-based mainstream national security prestige 
press consumes their own frames largely from the smaller trade publications. 
Theoretical Connections to Research Findings 
This study’s literature review exposed 1) the need to elaborate framing theory 
in mass communications (Reese & Lewis, 2009), 2) the need for reconsidering the 




post-9/11 era (Moeller, 2004), 3) the lack of primary scholarship regarding terrorism 
(Silke, 2004), 4) the dearth of research that reveals perceptions of the communicators 
themselves (Matthes, 2009), and 5) a gap in the literature that offers the integral 
connections between terrorism and mass communication scholarship in the context of 
media studies (Nacos, 2007). To expound, a discussion of theoretical connections to 
the research findings is offered below largely in reflection of the lierature review 
order found in Chapter Two; two exceptions to this order is the addition of a new 
theory to help explain study results and an explanation of new journalist routines, 
which is foundational to the subsequent description of a post-9/11 hierarchy of 
influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). 
Agenda Setting 
 Since this study utilized grounded theory for data analysis, results uncovered 
the addition of another useful theory that may be helpful: agenda setting (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972). Agenda setting is the theory that media have a substantial influence 
on their audiences by choosing certain topics as “news” over others and therefore 
placing prominence on certain topics over others. Reporters commented on their 
ability to “play a very influential role” and to “set the agenda” during several 
interviews.  
Although most reporters attributed this feeling of influence to their perceived 
increased autonomy, study results also revealed a perception of an increased use of 
journalist as source -- another form of agenda setting via reporter agency. This “new”
routine seems to have come about due to the economic cutbacks leaving skeleton 




original reporter for a story we don’t have time to cover on the air to give that news to 
our audience.” 
Furthermore, this study found evidence of the “War on Terror” Frame 
evolving past general public naturalization (Reese & Lewis, 2009) and into the 
reporter’s agency (internalization). For example, these journalists perceiv  this frame 
is no longer used in direct content, yet the concept lives on. This was evidenced by 
many participants sharing stories of their personal attempts to redefin  the “War on 
Terror” Frame into new phrases on their own. 
Framing Theory 
By and large, journalists in the D.C.-based national security prestige press 
corps report that they do utilize framing practices when disseminating their s ories. In 
fact, most recognize and even use the term “framing” when speaking about how they 
present their stories and rationalized the means via the end goal of audience 
comprehension (Jamieson & Waldman, 2003). In support of Peterson’s (2007) 
argument that journalists frame their own work, participants often referred to their 
reporting in frames such as “a quest for truth” and offered allusions to their heroism 
to “be a light shining in the darkness” sometimes even as a “first responder.”   
 Building on the Lewis and Reese’s (2009) work, dissertation results 
supported that these journalists believe the “War on Terror” frame itself has evolved 
since 9/11 from transmission to reification to naturalization. Likewise, reporters agree 
that this frame has the ability to change in dynamics and definitions over time (Reese, 
2001a). Additionally, this study’s results supported that journalist’s personal 
communications tag the “War on Terror” frame as naturalized into their own 




Curiously, participants claimed the “War on Terror” frame was “useless” 
(Lewis & Reese, 2009), yet attributed worth to its ability to quickly communicate 
with their audience. Generally however, results indicated that journalists agreed with 
the operational framing definition used in this study to denote that this frame
provided them with “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over 
time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese, 
2001a, p. 11). For example, many journalists discussed how the term helped them 
create social and symbolic meaning for their audiences by denoting that “when I used 
that phrase, everyone knew what I meant.” Furthermore, reporters said they sought 
“an easy way to communicate” with their audiences and the “War on Terror” phrase 
“organized the complexities of the topic under one big umbrella for me.” Perhaps 
when participants communicated they thought this term was useless, they really 
meant to say “vague,” as this attribute would offer allure to any journalist seeking to 
intrigue and connect with their audience. 
Indeed, journalists acknowledge the power of a frame to move the political 
dial, as Entman (2004), Iyengar (1987), and Patterson (1993) have argued. Moreover, 
journalists indicated recognition of their role in this process – namely, helping to 
condition the public over time to understand national security issues via “leaning on 
the ‘War on Terror’ terminology” as Norris et al (2003) and Sadaba and La Porte 
(2006) found. Even though participants said they would qualify the term when used 
with quotes or its source (President Bush) and some argued they “were only passing
the terminology along,” most considered “that time frame was an institutional failure” 
and often voiced heavy personal responsibility for the lack of questioning or quest for 




interviews. Alternative frames would not have asked “How can the U.S. win the ‘War 
on Terror’?” or “Which presidential candidate offered a stronger plan for the ‘War on 
Terror’,” but whether we should engage in a war in the first place. 
A few reporters did indicate that they “helped determine whether we would 
enter this war or not” supporting the work of Boyd-Barrett (2004), Moeller (2004), 
and Norris et al (2003). Insightfully, some participants tagged the “War on Terror” 
frame as “an insidious means to help perpetuate fear across America,” supporting 
what Moeller (2004) argued and pointedly revealing that they did “help describe the 
conflict against America,” with “a blanket of support” for retaliatory actions requiring 
state sponsored violence (Lewis & Reese, 2009). Overall, this group acknowledged 
their continuous repetition of this term in their own news reports and the implications 
that ensued, some journalists even pointed to the deaths of many American soldiers.  
Although journalists readily offered remorse for inhibiting open discourse and 
discouraging alternative responses to war (Lewis & Reese, 2009; Moeller, 2004; 
Reynolds & Barnett, 2003), study results also support the continued use of “dominant 
national frames” in reporting on national security as a justification for continui g in 
war, thus supporting the work of Powers and el Nawawy (2009). For example, 
journalists report that they continue to have difficulty communicating succinctly with 
their audiences about the current wars in the absence of employing a “War on Ter or” 
frame. Not only does this indicate that participants are still engaged in framing the 
Wars in nationalist terms -- not seeking to challenge or change those frames-- but 
this also supports Moeller’s notion that the media has lost its “moral imagination” nd 
that the “War on Terror” frame successfully “threatens a nuanced understanding of 




Journalist statements also supported Entman’s (2004) work by indicating that 
the “War on Terror” frame strengthened at the intersection of their reporting and the 
government’s use of the term. For example, even though participants acknowledged a 
role in helping to promulgate the term, many fell back on the sentiment that “I was
only reporting the news of the day” or “This was how my audience best understood 
the issue.” As scholarship suggests, both the government and the news media utilize 
well-traveled frames to appeal to the public at large (Sadaba & La Porte, 2006). In 
fact, study participants said that in hindsight, they helped pave the road to war -- 
ultimately supporting what Anker (2005), McChesney (2002), Reynolds and Barnett 
(2003), Zelizer and Allan, (2002) and countless other scholars argue was a blind 
alignment with the U.S. government post-9/11.  
However, study results challenged Entman’s (2004) notion that a frame will 
only change in the face of elite disunity – when government officials begin to quarrel. 
Entman’s assertion is logical considering that the media often follow conflict. 
However, as one reporter noted, “even after Congress was at each other’s throats 
again, the ‘War on Terror’ phrase was still readily used… it was too late to turn 
back.” It seems in this case, elite disunity over the term -- and even over the wars 
waged by the United States -- did not alter the media’s love affair with the “War on 
Terror” frame at that time. The reluctance of the media to closely follow this elite 
disunity, for whatever reason, created a vacuum where alternative viewpoints were 
not heard (Moeller, 2004).  
Furthermore, study results illustrated that the increasing availability of “event-
driven news” helps to protect against indexing (Bennett, 1990) government sources 




of a post-9/11 news atmosphere leaves them in control for most news content choices 
and they are not forced into repeating what government officials are messaging. 
However, evidence also suggested that when reporters do uncover government 
information, these journalists are often beholden to just a few of the same sources 
repeatedly (Entman, 2004).  
Finally, study results found support for the “trickle down effect” (Dimitrova & 
Stromback, 2008) of the prestige press (Kellner, 1995). Specifically, participants 
report that the terrorism frames first chosen for use by the D.C.-based national 
security prestige press are 1) “bounced around in our D.C. echo chamber” and 2) 
often end up repeated throughout world media. Ultimately, journalists acknowledged 
both challenges influencing other U.S. media outlets with their own reporting, as 
evidenced in their accounts of requests to appear on TV to discuss their print story, 
for example, or hearing their “print story read aloud word-for-word on the radio with 
mistakes that had since been fixed,” as well as using other media outlets to help fram  
the topic or angle they would report on for a given day. Many also pointed to media 
outlets outside of D.C. and across the world as having “ripped off my story word for 
word.”  
New Routines 
As a result of decreased access, several reporters revealed that many 
Washington, D.C. newsrooms have changed their source naming policies, ultimately 
creating a new culture of what this study termed the “post-9/11 anonymous source 
phenomena.” This paradigm shift occurred when national security reporters were 
given increased autonomy to “get the story” given the sensitive nature of the content 




new national security reporter and a source. One reporter lamented the implications of 
this “increasingly accepted routine” with the comment that “these people say things 
and then later in life get into really important positions of power but you don’t have 
them on record saying things in the past that could relate to what they’re 
doing….really frustrating.”  
Furthermore, although a 24-7 news cycle has been in play for more than a 
decade, this study’s findings strongly support increasing pressure on reporte s t  
continuously provide “instant news” to feed this cycle in the face of increasing 
technological demands and new online product venues, as well as dwindling 
economic resources and staff. Therefore, journalists attest that in this “high-paced 
atmosphere,” there is “no time to check in with people back at the office,” particul ly 
in breaking news situations -- as terrorism-related issues often are. I  fact, in these 
situations, as well as during less immediate terrorism related stories, this group of 
reporters asserted that they often are given or “forced into sole decision-maki g 
power.” It is in these times, a reporter’s social construction of reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966) seems to supersede, even consume, other hierarchy levels. Through 
participant interviews, it seems this new autonomy level spreads throughout the 
framing of news process, supporting the findings of Lewis and Reese (2009), and not 
just during immediate, breaking news situations as Barnett and Reynolds (2009) 
found.  
Hierarchy of Influences Model 
This study found support for the usefulness of the hierarchy of influences 
model, although the need for evaluating the model in a post-9/11 era will be discussed 




journalists. For example, the recent news industry cutbacks could be one reason why 
journalists are experiencing increased autonomy; they are left with a skeleton staff. 
Second, each of the levels in the model hasimpacted D.C. prestige press in 
some way. For example, the “War on Terror” frame ultimately became a pr v iling 
ideological influence, the government’s construction and promulgation of this term 
was an extra-media influence, media organizations did hold meetings to discuss how 
best to utilize this frame, and media routines impacted the length and pace of getting 
stories on terrorism published or aired. Nonetheless, this study did not find evidence 
of an ordered hierarchy, where the individual level is subsumed by all the others. 
Instead, study findings support what recent scholarship has revealed regarding 
breaking television news situations such as terrorism, namely that a journalist’s 
personal biases perhaps most strongly influence news structure and angle due to the 
instant news turnaround required and the need for journalist-as-source in these high-
pressure, solo situations (Reynolds & Barnett, 2003).  
To reiterate, evidence in this study does not point to the individual level of the 
hierarchy of influence model functioning in a vacuum; rather this level should be re-
evaluated in a post-9/11 era, including a consideration of how the worst economic 
downturn in America since the Great Depression has impacted media industry staff 
numbers. Perhaps then, we can appropriate the proper level of influence from (or as 
an exception for) this specific type of reporter.  
However, at this heightened level of national security reporting responsibility, 
the hierarchy of influences model almost certainly requires modification as, at the 
individual level, a journalist’s personal background, bias and opinion will provide the 




situation. Based on the evidence presented in the results section, national security
reporters indicated that they perceive having a stronger influence on news content
than the hierarchy of influences model suggests, particularly in an era where seasoned 
terrorism reporters expressed experiencing little to no editorial oversight, usually win 
the battle when they are challenged by editors, and operate in a city rife with 
anonymous source acceptance. Nonetheless, while evidence clearly denotes a change 
in journalist routine, based on this study, participant perceptions of increased 
influence over news content is still just that, a perception. 
Media and Terrorism  
Participants studied did not voice concerns about potentially harmful 
consequences that may arise from the media-terrorist connection. In fact, although 
participants acknowledged that terrorists, like many others, have an agenda and do 
attempt to garner media coverage, no participant in this sample discussed, from the 
terrorist viewpoint, how a terrorist cause might gain credibility or a political win, by a 
reporter deciding to give the terrorist media coverage (Hoffman, 2006; Moeller, 2004; 
Nacos, 2007; Torres-Soriano, 2008). Thus, in line with their tradition, the vast 
amount of scholarship that supports media coverage of terrorism impacting the public 
policy process was not a consideration of these participants. At the same time 
however, most reporters acknowledged that their reporting did often impact public 
policy emanating from Washington, D.C. (Capella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 
1993) and sometimes, even supported what has been termed the “CNN Effect” – 
where media from America can be the first to affect the public policy of governments 




Therefore, study results indicated direct opposition of reporters to accept what 
much of scholarship characterizes as the media-terrorism relationship, often terming 
that “uneasy” (Barnett & Reynolds, 2009) connection as a “double-edged sword” 
(Bowen, 2005) or “symbiotic” (Nacos, 2007; Nagar, 2007) -- leading to a 
legitimization of terrorist goals via media coverage (Bowen, 2005; Hoffman, 2006;
Nacos, 2007; Weimann, 2004).  
While several journalists did provide examples of instances where the 
government, or their audience, expressed anger for their terrorism coverage saying,
“It might aid in terrorist knowledge or give credibility to a terrorist cause,” most 
participants argued that such reporting is not only an issue of “the public’s right to 
know,” but also fills an important advocacy role for their audiences to ultimately gain 
the necessary knowledge to combat terrorism. Moreover, these reporters emphatically 
disagree with scholars who have concluded that all publicity is good for the terrorist 
(Bowen, 2005) and that without publicity, terrorist goals would never be achieved 
(Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2007). However, where scholarship and practitioners tend to 
agree regards what much of scholarship has called “media-oriented terrorism” 
(Weimann & Winn, 1994) or “mass-mediated terrorism” -- which among other 
factors asserts that the only means whereby the public can understand or learn about 
terrorism is from the media (Nacos, 2003).  
Recent scholarship to examine the impact of new technologies, specifically 
the use of the Internet by terrorists, are supported by this study’s findings as well 
(Weimann, 2004). Study participants agree that terrorists are now more often 
choosing to bypass main stream media to communicate directly with the individual 




(Sciolino & Mekhennet, 2008). Likewise, reporters indicated that terrorists as sources 
are easier to come by due to the increasingly ubiquitous digital age and this new 
availability has become part of their source development strategy (Liebes & Kampf, 
2007). Finally, most journalists acknowledged their integral role as framers with the 
power to choose or angle a story, although findings also support that this privilege is 
dispersing because of the non-stop communication flow now available online (Lewis, 
Kaufhold, & Larosa, 2010). 
Scholarship exploring the lack of holistic domestic terrorism coverage in 
America was also supported (Chermak & Greunewald, 2006). Although participants 
claimed immediately post-9/11, they took great care to no  panic the public by over-
reacting when reporting on terrorism-related stories, many partici nts said there 
were too many stories to cover now, and therefore they only focused on the “most 
sensational stories” – those that would make for better ratings and ultimately a 
“happier employer.”  
While not directed by an editor or producer to do so, these journalists 
indicated the “normal routine” was now to choose the terrorism-related story that 
“made the audience’s mouth drop,” even though “I always felt dirty when I did.” One 
reporter explained that while she could “probably combat this situation and win on 
her own,” the “news trend” that many reporters indicated as “heightening the 
sensationalism of terrorism news” was “one of the main reasons” she had decided to 
leave her media outlet in the coming weeks. Perhaps “sensationalism” is another 
internally-understood and adopted frame inside media organizations that has now 





Theoretical Development and Interpretation 
Framing 
 Scholars have called for the expansion of framing theory in these areas and 
have communicated an urgency to not only understand how these reporters consume, 
internalize and disseminate such information (Lewis & Reese, 2009; Reese & Lewis,
2009; Barnett & Reynolds, 2009), but to also encourage or discover better ways of 
reporting about terrorism that might help discourage further violence and/or act as n 
effective catalyst of information, and perhaps even comfort, to their audiences 
(Entman, 2004; Fox, 2003; Nacos, 2007).  
Elaboration on Framing Theory: Presidential Administration Personality. 
Participants revealed an interesting finding through interviews on their perceptions of 
how they 1) understood how government officials were framing the issue of 
terrorism, and 2) how they chose to frame terrorism under different presidential 
administrations -- namely the Bush and Obama administrations. At least partially, 
reporter perceptions of the government’s terrorism framing seem to change with the 
administration in power and this affected the way they reported on terrorism.  
For example, reporters relayed that they perceived the Bush Administration as 
laden with deep conflict, as several said, “whether deserved or not,” and therefore, 
perceived the terrorism issue framed by government as a conflict of interests. 
However, with the Obama administration, it seems these same reporters see trrorism 
now being framed more as a pursuit of common interests.  
This perception did not stop at an opinion, however, but in participant words 
“continued into my story angle.” Often, reporters cited they feel obliged to inform the 




Further research should attempt to match the prevailing reporter perceptions of an 
administration (laden with conflict, committed to change, a one-world viewpoint, 
etc.) with how reporters perceive the “personality” of that administration – a very 
complex, but likely important framing issue. 
Reese and Lewis’s (2009) Frame Cycle Model: Completing the Steps. 
Previous studies (Reese & Lewis, 2009) suggest that a frame cycle, while dynamic, 
only has three pieces: transmission, reification and naturalization. Using the “War on 
Terror” frame as the application, my findings indicated the presence of a fourth and 
fifth new piece to the frame cycle for this sample: Construction and Internalization.  
Although these authors tersely mention the term, internationalization, they are 
doing so in the context of a journalist’s attempt to utilize shared frames to 
communicate, such as the “War on Terror.” However, internalization as this study 
argues, goes beyond the third framing element of naturalization that Reese and Lewis 
propose. This new element does not just address a frame’s power to become 
naturalized into the public psyche whereby a journalist would use that specific frame 
to bridge understanding with their audience, but journalists are now faced with 
determining how their own collective naturalization has become personally 
internalized so that they can continue communication with their audiences regarding 
the “War on Terror” without using those words specifically. Given the “Overseas 
Contingency Operation” frame did not gain media traction, internalization is further 
evidenced by journalists’ claim that the “War on Terror” frame lives on. This reality 
has now placed the post-“War on Terror” frame wholly in the reporter’s hands to 




personal experiences and background, and in many cases as a function of their person 
9/11 experience itself.  
Likewise, Reese and Lewis’s (2009) frame cycle is missing the genesis of the 
frame itself -- a beginning cycle step I have simply called Construction. Further study 
of the actual birth of a frame might also aid in a better theoretical understanding of a 
frame’s complete cycle – beginning with what becomes dominant, or “catches on” 
and what does not. Construction does not only begin with extra-media entities such as 
the government or public relations professionals. For example, this study found 
evidence that the life history and experience for these journalists is an influencer on 
their framing choices and news content building approaches. Therefore, personal 
experience likely plays a role in the construction phase of a frame. 
My two proposed additions to Reese and Lewis’s (2009) frame cycle 
(construction and internalization) offers scholars a basis for richer undestanding of 
how a frame first is constructed, becoming a catch phrase that will eventually be 
transmitted and reified, only to become naturalized into the public psyche, but may 
then transition further into internalization. 
Although I believe these additional pieces to Reese and Lewis’s (2009) frame 
cycle model can serve as a basis for further theoretical development to explain the 
framing cycle for journalists, they will likely require modification and revisions as 
future testing commences. For example, does the internalization of a frame by a top 
echelon journalist then reignite the construction/transmission process all over again?
Also, what time frame is expected, or has precedent, for each step in the model? Is 
this model only applicable to terrorism frames, or D.C.-based prestige press, since 




other reporter populations and/or frames in other areas such as sports or health? 
Finally, since participants indicated their new autonomy was partly given as a 
function of a poor economy and a skeleton staff, what happens if the news industry 
rebounds with a full staff of editors, who once again engage in providing layers of 
approval? 
New Journalist Routines. There is evidence that many Washington, D.C. 
newsrooms loosened their source naming policies post-9/11 to accommodate the 
changing news landscape, namely decreased source access. According to participants, 
this ultimately created a new culture of what this study calls the “post-9/11 
anonymous source phenomena,” where national security reporters were given 
increased autonomy to obtain the story, given the sensitive nature of the content 
sought, as well as the need for quickly establishing trusted source relationships.  
This new autonomy seems to have increased rapidly due to two main factors: 
1) a new culture of heightened security requiring more trust of the journalist by both 
source and editor and 2) the economic downturn and loss of jobs for journalists gave 
reporters still working more autonomy because they are now completing additional 
work, often times with the additional requirement of maintaining an online presence 
as well. It should be noted that industry cutbacks could be another explanation for 
increased autonomy, or at least a contributing factor. Therefore, the individual level 
of the hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) may need to be 
reevaluated to consider post-9/11 reporting routines, at least for this group of 






Evaluating the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
The mainly unchallenged hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 
1996), while still useful, needs updating in a post-9/11 world (Figure 2). Shoemaker 
and Reese forged their model in a time when “traditional” media was discernable and 
organizations clearly wielded strong influence. As the model stands, there is no 
consideration for several new media situations that have become highly prevalent 
since 1996. In fact, for each of the following situations, scholarship supports that 
journalist influence subsumes all other levels in the hierarchy model.  
First, with the emergence of a “special terror-related genre within journalism,” 
(Mogenson, 2008), the evidence from recent scholarship that journalists as a whole 
have more autonomy (Beam, Weaver, & Brownlee, 2009), as well as results from this 
study of the perception of increased D.C.-based national security prestige press 
autonomy, reporters on the whole seem to be experiencing a trend toward greater 
influence than the hierarchy model allows. Second, scholarship has found that 
reporters in breaking news situations with no time to check in with anyone else 
(Barnett & Reynolds, 2009), including journalists participating in military embeds 
(Fahmy & Johnson, 2008; Kim, 2010), also experience strong levels of autonomy. 
These realities, too, are not addressed in the hierarchy model. Finally, this model does 
not consider new media technologies, specifically online citizen journalism and the 
emergence of bloggers and social media not beholden to a particular media 
organization. In this case, the importance of the organization level in this model may 
be diminishing or disappearing.  
 The hierarchy of influences model interprets the individual level of journalist 




journalist influence in the absence of routine, as described above. Therefore, much 
like the framing process itself, the model proposed below offers a more dynamic 
relationship among the levels of influence, in relation to the individual, when building 
news content. Moreover, this illustration allows for the modern realities of the 
situations described above, namely, ascribing due influence to the individual 
journalist in certain post-9/11 circumstances. It is in these situations that a reporter’s 




This model reconsiders the individual level of influence in a post-9/11 world, 
allowing this level to span across the concentric circles. Thus far, and in addition to 
recent scholarship that supports a general increase in autonomy for U.S. reporters 
(Beam, Weaver, & Brownlee, 2009), this model fits three situations: 1) military 
embed reporters (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009; Kim, 2010), 2) breaking TV news 
(Barnett & Reynolds, 2009) and 3) the D.C. national security journalist who can 
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operating without traditional routines in place as explained herein.2 Furthermore, this 
model may need to update to consider online citizen journalism with the emergence 
of bloggers and social media who are not beholden to a particular media organization. 
In this case, the importance of the organization level in this model may be 
diminishing or disappearing.  
Journalist Socialization and Hierarchy of Influences 
 Journalists experience a lifetime of socialization and interaction with the other 
levels of the hierarchy of influences model. For example, a future reporter who first 
interns within a media organization as a college senior is socialized into that 
organization’s culture from the beginning. Likewise, the influence of the ideologis a 
reporter is exposed to growing up helps to socialize them into society and could have 
a great influence upon their world view. This situation was best evidenced when 
reporters discussed the impact of their childhood on how they choose to frame their 
news stories today. 
Therefore, regardless of participant perceptions, the socialization that a 
reporter experiences, in direct relation to all the levels of the hierarchy model, 
complicates the notion that these journalists are, in reality, able to supersede the 
hierarchy model levels. Thus, even though participants report a greater feeling of 
autonomy, perhaps their autonomy is still firmly rooted within the influence of the 
other hierarchy levels such as ideology, extra media, organization and routine. 
                                                
2 Decreased access to terrorists and government agency officials has provided an 
acceptance for increased use of anonymous sources and withholding or destroying 





 Similarly, although participants are covering a uniquely sensitive beat – 
national security -- and are located within a unique geographic region – Washington, 
D.C. – each carrying a unique power that comes with responsibility for such a life and 
death topic as well as unique access to top government elites, these journalists may 
simply be revealing what all reporters are experiencing in the curr nt economic 
downturn, namely, using the same sources repeatedly and the feeling of greater 
autonomy due to now having to operate with a skeleton staff. On the other hand, it 
could be the case that the hierarchy model was too simplistic to capture the compl x 
intricacies of reporting on national security inside the Capitol of the United States in a 
post-9/11 era.  
Implications on Theory and Practice 
 Given the evidence in this study, there are important implications on both 
theory and practice discussed below. Before beginning this discussion, however, it 
should be noted that perhaps these reporter’s routines and perceptions are not “new” 
per se, but only new to these particular reporters, as often history will repeatitself. 
Regardless, this discussion will center on the goal of this dissertation – exploring the 
perceptions of this study’s participants.  
Framing Theory 
This study found evidence for an influential factor in determining how a 
reporter may choose to frame terrorism – his/her view of the current presidential 
administration’s “personality.” Overall, participants shared that theirperception and 
reporting choices followed how they viewed the current administration. Specifically, 
journalists attributed the Bush Administration with an “us vs. them” mentality tha  




Administration was attributed with seeking similarities with others in the world and 
therefore terrorism was framed as a pursuit of common interests. 
Not only can this finding help to provide better context for future studies 
regarding how the D.C. national security prestige press reporter frames terrorism, but 
perhaps this notion of perceived “personality” of a person, place, thing or group of 
people is an important discovery when conducting framing scholarship.  
Reese and Lewis’s Frame Cycle Model 
Evidence for journalists using other words to describe violent groups such as 
rebels, insurgents, militants and so on, is not new to scholarship (Picard, 1993), 
however, the connection between the naturalized “War on Terror” frame, that still 
exists in the public psyche, and the journalist’s new task of explaining this frame 
without explaining it (but still alluding to the original frame) has not been studied. 
Perhaps this is because no other case exists such as this one, or perhaps this has 
occurred with other frames in the past. Regardless, these journalists are now wholly 
in control of personally re-framing a frame (“War on Terror”) that has beenrej cted, 
but in name only. 
To be clear, the notion of a frame becoming i ternalized goes beyond the first 
three levels (transmission, reification, naturalization), whereby a journalist isn’t 
simply using a frame to communicate with an audience already conditioned or 
“naturalized” into understanding and collective acceptance of a concept, nor as an 
umbrella to several concepts, but actually takes the frame cycle deeper to rest on 
another level completely whereby the agency belongs to the journalist themselv s. As 
reported, these journalists may no longer be using the specific terminology “War on 




exists, and is employed in their psyche. Now, reporters illustrate they are working 
hard to communicate their own perception of what the “War on Terror” should mean 
as salient in their audience’s mind. Evidence showed reporters grapple with this “gap 
in national security reporting” almost daily. 
This finding may only exist because the “War on Terror” frame has not yet 
been replaced.  Moreover, the new perceived autonomy reported by these participants 
may possibly be what allows them to morph the “War on Terror” frame and 
appropriate it for their own, personal uses and phrases. Nonetheless, scholarship has a 
unique opportunity to explore the continuing cycle of this macro frame as a potential 
example of future adopted frames. Furthermore, another small change should be 
added to this model: construction. Obviously, a frame’s cycle does not begin with 
transmission and in some cases, is actually strategized as a potentially-appealing 
frame by political actors. Therefore, I propose further testing of a new frame cycle of 
five components, construction, transmission, reification, naturalization and 
internalization. 
Evaluating the Hierarchy of Influences Model  
Another model this study addressed was the hierarchy of influences model 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). This research contributed to forward theoretical 
movement by addressing a unique set of reporters -- the Washington, D.C. national 
security prestige press -- who, even by the model founder’s admission (Reese, 2001b, 
p. 102-103), hold greater power than most reporters in the news building process. 
However, their model needs to be reconsidered to account for post-9/11 media routine 
changes.  




covering the most classified beat in the business – national security in Washington, 
D.C. -- the model also did not, could not, account for a post-9/11 world where the 
walls of government secrecy have caused such increasing concerns for the welfar  of 
sources, that these journalists are now trusted with much greater autonomy than ever. 
Similarly, the hierarchy model could not have foreseen the recent and severe 
economic news industry cutbacks which are only exacerbating, or perhaps causing, 
the increasing measures of individual journalist autonomy that, this study finds, often 
supersedes and acts independently of the other hierarchy levels. 
Media and Terrorism 
This study has mostly discouraging implications from its use of media and 
terrorism scholarship, although it did offer a rare glimpse at the insider’s viwpo nt to 
how terrorism is framed in the media – providing a qualitative study to span this gap 
in terrorism literature (Horgan, 2010).  
Study results may have exacerbated well-documented fears of how the media 
can legitimize terrorist messaging (Bowen, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 1994; 
Nagar, 2007). At the same time, findings also underscore that media themselves agree 
that the public understands terrorism through their reporting alone (Nacos, 2003; 
Weimann & Winn, 1994). Moreover, this dissertation illustrated the reasons why 
many scholars are calling for increased research on this important population of 
reporters in a post-9/11 world (Liebes & Kampf, 2007; Moeller, 2004). Perhaps most 
discouraging is the alignment of study participants with scholarship that is finding an 
increased use of terrorists as sources (Liebes & Kampf, 2007) and the increasingly 
effective terrorist use of new technologies to recruit members to their violent cause 




Finally, the results of this study have methodological implications as well. 
With the additional Internet access to reporters, via both professional and personal 
tools such as Facebook, scholars can proffer an intimacy with reporters never befor  
available. This ease of online communication may also encourage additional in-depth 
interview scholarship. Also, studying how a journalist frames the news via content 
analysis may be easier than ever and although some online journalists and bloggers 
are not as forthcoming about their own background, many authors are forthright with 
their opinions and biases – if not found on their blog or website, then on their social 
networking pages. Finally, framing studies in general can become more effici nt 
because scholars now have the ability to quickly read and download online articles. 
National Security Studies  
This research expands terrorism and national securities scholarship by directl
addressing the timely topic of terrorism and the communication channels so integral 
to terrorist goals. Furthermore, this study fills a gap in primary research (Silke, 2004) 
and studies the communicator themselves (Matthes, 2009) to aid in the understanding 
of how the national security prestige press of Washington, D.C. report on terrorism. 
Likewise, this study is one of only a few communication-based studies to explore 
these topics qualitatively, bringing relevant communication theory to the table while 
bridging the disciplines of national securities, political science and mass 
communication. 
With few qualitative terrorism studies available, this research also offers 
methodological advances to provide greater qualitative depth and a more holistic 
understanding of key national security news-building components that can only be 




the personal opinions, beliefs and attitudes of journalists in action as evidence of (or 
fodder for) the theoretical set of mechanisms that construct and determine the process 
of disseminating news about terrorism.  
Finally, study results indicated the need for a closer look at how terrorists are 
using new media to achieve their goals. If terrorist Internet use is truly creating a new 
brand of jihad (“Jihad Lite”), what do these changes say about the mindset of the 
global movement, its evolving structure and priorities? Determining the recruitment 
process for this new trend could be low hanging fruit for those who study Internet 
radicalization. Moreover, as terrorist popularity has decreased, perhaps the digital age 
has provided the means for these groups to practice better communication skills and 
ready themselves for future successful outreach towards targeted groups – whether 
via radicalization, cyber terror or a direct threat. 
Practical Implications 
This research offers several implications for the applied practice of th  
national security journalist. These include their personal framing choices and 
negotiations with new, post-9/11 journalism routines, as well as their dealings with 
terrorists and terrorism news.  
Before offering suggestions, it is important to clearly underscore the 
intelligence, transparency and thoughtfulness that these journalists provided during 
the interviews -- honestly critiquing their own work, their own profession and their 
own biases. Their personal reflections were largely offered as a function of their deep 
concern for bettering their profession. The rich insights these participants offered will 
go a long way in providing a better understanding of their sense making during the 




overstatement to assert that these reporters have the experience necessary to prevent 
another U.S.-led war from being so easily accepted into the public sphere of debate.
Framing Terrorism  
This study findings offer practical contributions and identify best practices o 
journalists as they seek, consume, interpret, and disseminate the “War on Terror” 
frame (whether directly or indirectly), and terrorism information in general, to the 
public at large. While scholars continue to explore immediate operational solutions 
for the journalist from both a human protection and a policy perspective – namely, 
focusing on discouraging terrorism and questioning frame choices, which could be 
argued to be one and the same -- journalists can also take action.  
For example, both Epkins (2008) and Lewis and Reese (2009) found that 
national security journalists themselves are frustrated with the use of the “War on 
Terror” frame by both government and themselves, seeking always to succinctly but 
accurately communicate nebulous yet central terms to their audience. Even in th  
absence of public dialogue to counter frame the overriding rhetoric of public officials, 
reporters have a responsibility to avoid buzz words that side-step healthy debate. 
Instead of contributing to the reification of a frame by relaying what an official says, 
perhaps journalists, particularly those who have experienced the “War on Terror” 
framing era, should have their critical antenna poised to ask whether that frame is 
appropriate to transmit.   
Moreover, as the theoretical implications explained, reporters should consider 
their own perceptions of the current administration when framing terrorism. Given 
that this population is the initial conduit through which government rhetoric flows, 




common interest) may affect their audience, including elite government officials who 
construct public policy. For example, if a reporter were to choose to frame terrorism 
as conflict alone, perhaps alternative means of addressing terrorism, such as p blic 
diplomacy might not be considered and open dialogue on another appropriate means 
to address terrorism might be quashed, particularly if the overwhelming audience 
sentiment is fear. Likewise, if a journalist were to choose to frame terrorism as a 
common interest, whereby other world powers need to bond together to address this 
issue, reporters should be cognizant that by moving the locus of the problem 
overseas, their audience may turn a blind eye to this important issue as well. 
Obviously, the answer is balance.  
Finally, reporters should be aware that they are also susceptible to other 
media’s framing choices. This group should consider where t y are consuming their 
own determined news frames. Of course, there are many players (politicians, PR 
practitioners, terrorists) attempting to garner news coverage, but study reslts al o 
indicated that the trade publications in D.C. are where most of these higher echelon 
reporters are choosing to draw story and framing ideas from. Likewise, thos 
reporters working for the inside-the-beltway trade publications should be awar that 
they wield great power as another initial contact point with senior government 
officials. The D.C. trade press, who generally view themselves as lowest on the media 
totem pole, might need to reframe their self-perception to understand the great 
responsibility that comes with being watched and read by more seasoned reporters. 
Ironically, it seems that the small, trade press are the true prestige press of 





Media and Terrorism  
A gap seems to exist in participant minds regarding the true impact of media 
coverage -- the connection of their reporting to the possibility of inciting or aiding 
further terrorist acts. This rationalization seems inconsistent and ironic because the 
journalist also argues that they serve as advocates for Americans to learn the new 
ways in which terrorists can attack. Thus for the reporter, their intention in revealing 
such information is that when an American learns the intricacies of bomb making, 
they would then be motivated to act as citizens that could elect politicians or enact 
special measures to combat these potential harms. At the same time however, this 
group does not consider how the same report might give similar information to a 
would-be terrorist, as their focus -- right or wrong -- is the attentions of their 
immediate American audience and not necessarily the longer term consequences.  
Therefore, reporters should continue to possess a strong conviction of filling an 
advocacy role for their audiences to inform the citizenry with the necessary information 
to act. However, journalists should balance this with a more careful consideration for 
the impact of their reporting on legitimizing terrorist goals and potential harmto the 
lives of both civilians and military members. I acknowledge this is incredibly difficult 
in an increasingly competitive environment that often requires last minute decision-
making, but simply justifying reporting on how to make a bomb upon the public has a 
“right to know” isn’t always responsible reporting.  
Moreover, this prestige press should recognize the great power they possess to 
frame issues and to begin or end dialogue in other media across America and around 
the world. Likewise, given that each participant illustrated at least one example where 




isolate themselves into the justification that no potential outcome, no matter how bad, 
could rationalize not reporting on terrorism. This in no way means they should not 
report these types of stories, rather simply that more consideration be attempted prior to 
their public release.  
Unfortunately, given the current journalistic landscape with fewer staff, this 
suggestion may be a luxury and not a possibility. Also, with bloggers and online 
citizen journalists simultaneously breaking news, the temptation to gethe s ory first 
may cause a reorganization of priorities and processes. However, as reporters gr w 
more seasoned at terrorism coverage, perhaps this will facilitate innatedecision-
making ability to naturally address these matters as they come along every day. 
Therefore, I strongly encourage media outlets to employ and maintain highly-
experienced journalists in prestige press positions, even in the face of economic 
cutbacks and particularly those covering terrorism, as it is clear that those journalists 
that have covered national security for the greatest length of time, have learn d to 
take the time to carefully consider the impact of their reporting. 
However, it is not difficult to gauge which is the greater good – informing the 
public so they can take action, or withholding information to: 1) prevent inciting 
panic and 2) preventing information being disseminated to those who would use it for 
harm. As a First Amendment supporter myself, I tend to agree with this sample that 
informing the public is by and large, the better option. In any case, I encourage 
balanced news content decision-making. And, after hearing many statements to the 
effect of “I don’t care if I’m being accused of helping the terrorist,” I believ  




government officials as a secrecy smokescreen to provide an excuse not to share 
information that actually should be relayed to the public. 
Beat Demarcation. Another suggestion which might help to streamline 
national security news and prevent gaps in terrorism coverage is for reporters and 
media organizations to encourage a more efficient, consistent and definitiv  beat 
demarcation across media outlets. For example, a more efficient and definitive 
demarcation of the national security beat versus the homeland security beat might 
prove helpful for both a better public understanding of this complex matter, as well as 
aid in better journalist organization and grasp of an issue, deeper source development 
and richer story context. Unknown to much of the American public, media outlets 
often treat national security and homeland security as separate, when many ti es the 
information coming out of the various agencies that is covered under each beat either 
contradicts or overlaps in meaningful ways. Recognizing that each beat is 
considerably large, at the very least the reporters assigned to various interrelated 
agencies should be paired to compare and contrast notes, with the goal of uncovering 
better information for their audience as well as understanding the fuller pictu e for the 
issue at hand. 
Similarly, a more efficient use of reporters covering the various governmental 
agencies might help quell misinformation or disinformation from reporting that often
leaves the public confused. For example, the Health and Human Services agency 
work on issues of bioterrorism, but by and large national security reporters do not 
cover this information in a terrorism context, rather health reporters are those 
assigned to such stories. This may cause a large gap in not only reporter knowledge of 




meal terrorism reports together, when many times they already overlap. Likewise, the 
opposite is true. When reporters seek the terrorism news angle for just any health 
story, for example to boost ratings, this can harm the audience psyche by contributing 
to the immunity of the public and loss of appetite for these stories. This could 
unintentionally create a “cry wolf” factor in the audience as many storie  in tially 
claiming terrorist ties turn out to be nothing of the sort.  
Likewise, a cloud of new cynicism seems to surround prestige press 
perceptions about changing and evolving government rhetoric. Lessons learned from 
the fallout surrounding reporter use of the “War on Terror” frame seem hard-won but 
well-ingrained. This could mean trouble, however, in that reporters may ignore future 
rhetoric as another “cry wolf” factor, when there really is news.  
New Routines. This study found evidence for new national security reporter 
routines in a post-9/11 culture, namely decreased access, leading to the need for a 
new phenomenon of increased anonymous source acceptance, leading to increased 
journalist autonomy. This trend is troubling and is removing the credibility that 
journalists maintain.  
Not only does this new routine force the hand of the journalist as sources may 
increasingly expect not to have their name revealed, but the very process that helps to 
safeguard objectivity is broken. Editors are no longer on the front lines with their 
journalists. And, this is happening inside a crucial, national topic.  Moreover, 
reporters have a heavy burden to bear alone. 
Many participants lamented that one implication of this newly widespread 
anonymous source acceptance affects future reporting as well. In one account, a 




what he previously said “off the record” in a prior story. This lack of government 
source accountability could make for continued claims for unnecessary walls of 
secrecy that will ultimately negatively impact the public and the journalism 
profession as a whole. Additionally, the prestige press “trickle-down effect” 
(Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008) could eventually apply to this concept, too, and 
spawn an increasing world-wide acceptance for anonymous sourcing in mainstream 
reporting. Indeed, the popular emergence of Wikileaks is already suggesting this 
trend may continue on a larger scale. 
Moreover, journalists should consider whether this phenomenon is causing 
repeated use of the same sources and how this might affect objective reporting. 
Likewise, in an age where sources are increasingly expected not to share their names 
with the public, reporters should take notice of this widespread phenomenon and push 
back on sources more frequently, even in the face of losing the story. Editors should 
support this decision. A collective journalist uprising may be necessary as well. 
Another danger this study found was the tendency for reporters to assume, 
with the widespread acceptance of anonymous sourcing, that unless information is 
offered off the record, it is likely not worth reporting. Should this “post-9/11 
anonymous source phenomenon” become contagious, or worse a newly accepted and 
naturalized frame in itself, this will only perpetuate little to no source accountability 
and increasingly compromised news quality. 
Digital Disguise. The main finding from discussions regarding new 
technologies is that the digital age is altering the news production process fr these 
reporters. Although these technologies are in many ways advancing the culturand 




an opportunity to connect with audiences and elusive sources (such as terrorists) on 
new levels, the existence and use of the Internet in particular is not without problems.  
Obviously, the new ability of terrorists to recruit and radicalize new members online 
is one negative impact from their increasingly efficient use of the Web. Moreover, the 
temptation that reporters now have to offer a platform to the terrorist because they are 
more easily accessible is a slippery slope to legitimizing their cause.  
Additionally, the age of already knowing the big players in D.C. personally 
may be coming to an end. Moreover, the large quantity of information that flows into 
the 24-7 format has caused reporters to feel more pressure to simply “get a story out 
whether thoroughly checked or not,” and makes it “tougher to distinguish fact from 
opinion” as the online world has millions of sites to choose from when researching an 
issue. Unfortunately, the danger emerges such that when everyone claims to have 
“authority” on a subject, then no one is the authority. The evolution of the digital age, 
coupled with the economic downturn, has caused higher pressure on journalists to 
garner top ratings for their employer and has apparently caused some reporters to 
loathe their own reporting “in the name of sensationalism that draws a crowd.” 
Likewise, journalists perceive that America is headed down a path of amusing 
ourselves to death, but are doing their best to not only adapt, but to fight back creating 
their own blogs and/or online presence to save their professions as they know it. It 
doesn’t seem that this is an issue of a stodgy group unwilling to change. Change is 
hard, yes. But, the overwhelming sentiments of these reporters, particularly those who 
grew up in a “just the facts ma’am” era, are “disheartened” at worse and “energized to 
preserve a press void of opinion” at best. However, with the popularity of prime time 




Audiences. Finally, although it is clear that journalists perceive that their 
audiences will seek and find information that only resonates with their preconceived 
ideologies and beliefs (including the non-coverage of foreign news because outlets 
assume Americans do not care), it is critical that reporters and news management not 
pander to their audiences, no matter how important ratings may be. A news outlet is 
supposed to inform, not pander to what their audiences want to hear.  
Pandering to the loudest voice can help perpetuate the oppression of a 
potential silent majority, undermining the democratic ideals this country was founded 
upon; this can also further polarize America. As evidenced lately, this separation c n 
lead to actual violence. Moreover, Americans are no longer consuming a steady diet 
of open dialogue and alternative viewpoints. Ultimately, the casualty is not just 
shallow-minded audiences, but could also lead America to isolate itself from the res  
of the world altogether. 
Methodological Limitations and Future Research 
Study Limitations 
The limitations of this research include issues surrounding its data collection 
methods, the study’s unit of analysis, personal bias and the consideration of historical 
context. These factors may have influenced results and are discussed below. 
Telephone interviews do not allow for face-to-face interaction, therefore thes  
interviews may have lacked depth of explanation and ability to build an intimate 
rapport. Likewise, the in-person interview may have impeded the collection of rich 
detail in that a face-to-face conversation can sometimes prove intimidating. 
Moreover, some interviews were conducted near to a participant’s place of work in a 




private location may have caused participants to hold back on disclosing experiences 
and opinions. During both telephone and face-to-face interviews, I tried to account for 
these limitations by explaining that there was no wrong answer and I was there to 
listen and learn from their experiences, that I would protect their confidentiality to the 
fullest extent, and by asking detailed follow-up questions.  
This study’s unit of analysis may prohibit a full understanding of the news 
gathering process for this particular group. Since the unit of analysis was delimited to 
individuals rather than at the organizational, routine, extra-media and ideological 
levels, results and interpretations are limited in the description of the full functions of 
this process.  
Personal bias and background may serve as another limitation. As a former 
reporter and public relations practitioner often working with the media, it is possible 
that my personal experiences influenced interviews, data analysis and interpreta ion. 
To mitigate this potential, I adhered to literature-spawned research questions and 
interview protocol, and engaged in rigorous grounded theory for data analysis. 
Future Research  
This study lends itself to encourage several directions for future study that 
would integrate the fields of mass communication, journalism and terrorism. 
Specifically, the areas of framing, media and terrorism, prestige press and routines 
should be further explored. 
Framing. First, I propose conducting additional research to include and test 
the additional pieces to Reese and Lewis’s (2009) frame cycle model for potential 
applicability to other journalist groups, beats and news frames. However, an 




scholars to provide a consistent operational definition for framing. Not only does 
there continue to be internal academic division on h w terrorism frames are 
examined, but the very definition and parameters of framing as a concept are not yet 
commonly understood (Entman, 2004; Reese, 2007). Until a better framework for 
defining framing, is achieved both as a concept and within operational models, future 
framing studies may not be able to offer substantive -- or at least consistent -- 
theoretical progression.  
Moreover, although it could be argued that post-9/11 global journalists were 
simply reporting the same frames as the American media at that time; in essence, the 
framers are themselves victims (or participants) of framing. Further esearch should 
explore this framing the framers process. This would also include the potential trickle 
down effect to other American media and take a special look at how the D.C. trade 
press fits into the larger framing process. 
Additionally, by interviewing a primary conduit of terrorism news coverage 
for America, and perhaps the world, this study offered an initial understanding of 
what influences this specific group of reporters to choose certain terrorism-related 
news content angles over others. This sample can provide fodder for future 
quantitative media effects analysis.  Other possible implications for future praxis and 
research on related theory and national security prestige press reporting might follow 
a specific terrorism-related frame’s transmission from government to journalist to 
public. While framing research should continue -- particularly given evidence that 
frames can change -- scholars rightly caution that ironically, the very act of studying a 
frame can help reify its power altogether and the very definition of framing that 





Media and Terrorism. Findings of this study supports much of media and 
terrorism scholarship and illustrated a crucial need to include media, and their pivotal 
role, in future studies seeking to understand how terrorism is framed by terroriss, the 
government, and/or audiences. Furthermore, in studies of public resiliency after a 
terrorist attack, the media should become a main unit of analysis for communicating 
necessary information to a large audience. Finally, qualitative studies engaging actual 
reporters/communicators are scarce and sorely needed to better understand, from the
insider’s viewpoint, how the world understands terrorism.  
Prestige Press. Future research should explore evidence for the socialization 
process of this population. For example, most of the participants disclosed they have 
had formal journalism training through an accredited University. Further studies 
could uncover how this training may have influenced their role in building news 
content, their perceptions of framing terrorism and the framing outcome of th ir 
stories. Moreover, research should examine how the socialization process may affect 
this press as they relate to the other rungs of the hierarchy of influences model, 
including, for example, a study to interview the editors in charge of this prestige 
press.   
Furthermore, evidence suggests that Washington, D.C. national security 
reporters, while not new to framing, are unique in other important ways. The 
changing nature of the news horizon has ushered in a new genre of reporter – the 
national security prestige press. Along with this title comes great responsibility and 
increasingly difficult occupational hazards. With a perceived long leash to choose 




times and across academic disciplines. Given the troublesome access issues to this 
elite public, however, perhaps a consortium could collaborate and construct a clever 
interview guide for this busy population without causing persistent interruption. 
Moreover, further research should explore the level of influence of the D.C. trade 
press, under the prestige press context, on the higher echelons of media as a potential 
instigator of the larger news wave. 
New Routines. Broaching the question of personal responsibility of a 
journalist to a source, future research should conduct related content analyses.  For 
example, if journalists view their source as threatening, (legal, terrorist, 
whistleblower, politician) do they adapt their writing to accommodate their fears or 
aspirations? Similarly, if an administration has the ability to reward or deny a reporter 
access (i.e. Fox news example), how does that impact journalist source use or story 
framing?  Furthermore, the sentiment of acting as a first responder or martyr for their 
audience should be explored more fully.  
Finally, given overwhelming evidence in this study that participants perceiv  
current journalism business models are dying, new models should be explored. For 
example, these reporters are intrigued by two specific and burgeoning new journalism 
models as begun by academic institutions across America and a private model calle  
Pro Publica. In fact, participants predict these models will be the future of news for 
America. Both emerging models should be studied for their merit and if nothing else, 
their historical underpinnings. Likewise, non-profit, academic and privately-funded 
operations should continue to engage in the evolving news process to help fill the gap
of downsizing mainstream news outlets and provide high-quality news services of 





The goals of this research were to explore current perceptions and attitudes 
among the Washington, D.C. prestige press covering national security and terrorism 
to examine evolving, post-9/11 national security reporter routines and learn more 
about the contemporary framing of media discourse regarding terrorism by both 
government officials and D.C. national security reporters themselves.  
To do this, I employed 35 in-depth interviews with D.C.-based national 
security prestige press regarding their meaning making and use of the “war on 
terrorism,” their understanding of the government’s construction and use of the “War 
on Terror” frame, and their perceptions of the recently attempted rhetoric shift to 
“Overseas Contingency Operation” by the Obama Administration.  
Generally, study results yielded a better understanding of national security 
reporting in a post-9/11 world, and for the first time, uncovered the insider’s 
viewpoint from the Washington, D.C. national security prestige press themselves. 
Specifically, several theme patterns regarding this dissertation’s four Research 
Questions were found that seem to confirm what much of normative scholarship 
asserts regarding the framing of terrorism immediately post-9/11. However, findings 
went beyond simple agreement that journalists largely failed in providing an open 
dialogue in the lead up to the War in Iraq. Data emerged to also discover how these 
reporters perceive their role in both the news gathering process in general as national
security correspondents in particular. Results also indicated evidence for the genesis 
of new theoretical additions to Reese and Lewis’s (2009) frame cycle model, a new 




unique situation never before addressed for the individual level of Shoemaker and 
Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model regarding the building of news content. 
Due to its unique context and combination of research streams as well as 
resulting findings, this study was theoretically and descriptively rich, adding to the 
understanding of framing, building news content and terrorism studies. Foremost, this 
study was the first to explore the perceptions of Washington, D.C. prestige press 
covering national security and terrorism and confirmed there was importance in 
examining the post-9/11 news gathering process for this unique group of reporters. In 
general, journalists are often overlooked by terrorism scholars as the initial portal and 
crucial conduit in the communication process among the government, terrorists, and 
the citizenry. Moreover, this population is often viewed as mere pawns and without 
human bias, nor as having the potential to function as mediators and independent 
political actors. Gaining greater insight into this population’s perceptions of their 
daily jobs did provide a better understanding of their role in the dissemination of 
terrorism information. In turn, this should help to inform future studies, not only on 
journalists themselves, their processes and operating conditions, but also on a range 
of national security issues from terrorist communication to government 
communicator strategies to audience reaction.  
This dissertation exposed a truly cross disciplinary study as it explored 
intersections of mass communication, journalism and national security issues that 
offer real implications for mass communication and journalism theory as well as 
political science and terrorism-related areas of concentration. This research also 
offered practical insight for praxis in the journalism, government communicator and 




Overall, reporters agree that when it comes to the “War on Terror,” they wer  
too focused on the term’s content and as a result missed offering the broader context 
surrounding what eventually evolved into a macro frame. A greater understanding of 
how these frame shapers impact contemporary terrorism discourse and the resulting 
public policy regarding national security is one key to building stronger, safer 
infrastructures to protect human lives. Likewise, I believe the most important scholarly 
contribution from this dissertation is its focus on an untapped, but powerful public. In 
giving voice to this unique population of journalists, results have identified their 
perceptions as potential lynchpins in the strategic process of combating terrorism.  
Finally, this group of journalists does not fully comprehend their uniqueness, 
wielding exclusive power to shape both domestic and world opinion. It would seem to 
be a positive outcome if each of them were to fully recognize this reality. As the 
Spider-Man credo memorializes "With great power there must come great 
responsibility" (Peter Parker, a.k.a. Spider Man), which we all believe down deep, even 
if this quote originates in the make believe realm of comic books. Without such an 
understanding, some in this group of individuals could easily become careless. To this 
end, I dedicate this work. May it be employed in this spirit of encouraging excellence in 










Appendix A: Reporter Recruitment Email 
Dear _________:  
As a former reporter myself, first allow me to thank you for your diligence a d 
hard work to disseminate necessary information to the American public, particularly on 
your specific beat. My name is Heather Epkins and I am a doctorate student at the 
University of Maryland, College Park currently pursuing a degree in communication. I 
specialize in the study of how the media cover terrorism-related issues, focu ing on the 
elite group, of which you are part, often called the “prestige press” of Washington, 
D.C.. This interest has grown out of my own experiences as a reporter and media 
relations professional for the past fifteen years.  
 
I would like to request the opportunity to take you to dinner or meet for coffee 
to discuss your thoughts and opinions on your profession. Specifically, I would like to 
know how you view the construction, use and evolution of the concept/phrase, “war on 
terror” in both the media and within our government. I am also interested in how your 
particular beat may differ from other beats in daily routines.   
 
ALL CONVERSATIONS ARE HIGHLY PROTECTED BY STRICT 
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS OF SUPREME CONFIDENTIALITY. No names or 
media outlets will ever be revealed and you may decline to answer any question or end 
your participation at any time. Furthermore, I will not ask any questions that may 
compromise your position with your employer, nor your job as a journalist. Your 
contribution to this research would offer both you and your fellow journalists potential 
value in practice, as well as your personal views the chance to be heard and recognized 
in a major piece of research. 
 
As a former reporter, I clearly understand time constraints and the need to 
remain flexible with scheduling. To that end, I am at your flexible call. I would like to 
begin meetings this summer (June), if possible. Our meeting would take place outsid
the workplace at a convenient, public location as jointly determined between you and 
me. Is there a time when you and I could meet for a 45 to 60 minute block? I’d like to 
contact you next week to set up a time for us to meet. 
 
I welcome any questions you may have regarding my research or my identity as 
a graduate student at the University of Maryland before you schedule a day and time to 
meet. Please also feel free to contact my dissertation advisor, Dr. Linda Aldoory, at 
laldoory@umd.edu or 301-405-6528; or myself at heather.epkins@gmail.com or 443-
871-7131. Thank you for your consideration and please consider sharing your 




Doctoral Student, Department of Communication 





































Appendix C – Reporter Interview Protocol 
 
Before we begin our conversation, may I get your permission to audio tape the  
 
interview, just so I can ensure accuracy later and listen better now? 
 
(If no), Okay, I understand.  Let’s get started with the interview. . . (takedetailed notes) 
(If yes), Great!  Let’s get started. 
As you know, I’m exploring the thoughts of national security journalists on their jobs in 
general and the concept of the “war on terrorism” more specifically. You’ve been a 
reporter in Washington, D.C. for some time. Let’s talk first about how and why you 
started in this business. 
(Grand Tour) 
1. Let’s talk first about how you came to choose a career as a NS journalist. 
2. On what topics do you mainly report and what is your most recent national 
security article?  
Probe: Is there a story that you are most proud of? Least proud? Why? 
(Related to RQ3: How does this prestige press understand their use of the “war on 
terrorism” in praxis?) 
3. Briefly tell me about your 9/11 experience and how it may have impacted 
your reporting. 
4. Generally, what do you think characterizes an effective, productive reporter 
for the national security beat? Is there a special set of skills, traits, 
philosophy? Probe: Level of autonomy, transparency, efficiency, access? 
5. Is your beat different than others? How? Does D.C. location play a role? 
6. In covering what can be considered an emotional beat, is it important for 




terrorism? Probe: How do you do this? What about a 9/11 situation? Is 
NS a more “personal” beat? 
(Related to RQ2: How does this prestige press understand the U.S. government’s 
role in the construction and use of the “War on Terror” frame?) 
Let’s briefly discuss sources, social networking and the day to day decisions you are 
faced with in covering national security and terrorism. 
7. What is your willingness to use and quote anonymous sources? Outlet 
rules? Always followed? Is NS reporting and/or D.C. culture more 
accepting of this practice?  
8. Have you ever declined to run a story on the request of a source or because 
of your own security concerns?  
9. Can you tell me a story on how you may have gone to extreme measures 
to inform your public about a national security news story? (Example: 
Whistle Blower Story; Knocked against congressional wall) 
10. How do you balance befriending your sources with performing a 
watchdog function?  
11. Do you utilize social networking when seeking sources? How? 
Probe: Which ones? Listen to poD.C.asts? Video? Blogs? Twitter? 
12.  Do you have a personal FB page? Twitter? My Space? Blog? 
Now, let’s talk more generally about journalism’s role in America.  
13. Do you perceive there has been a decline of traditional journalism? How? 
Probe: How has this impacted your reporting on national security items? 




14. Do you think that people still take news media seriously or more as 
entertainment now? (For example, with the rise of interactive opportunities 
to “participate” in the discussion.) 
Probe: Do you think this also happens with terrorism reporting? For example, 
are people are now experiencing the war as an interactive participant, instead of 
merely watching it on TV or reading about it in print? 
15. What role do you believe that national security journalists play in helping 
to set the agenda for politicians and for the public?  
Many labels have been provided for your particular group of reporters in D.C. such a  
“prestige press”….  
16. What does the term “front lines prestige press” mean to you? (it means 
you are the beginning of a trickle down effect, a media wave, an echoing 
press) 
Probe: Do you believe you are part of this group? Are you aware of “following 
suit” yourself and/or other journalists re-writing or even copying your storie 
into other venues?  
(Related to RQ1: How does Washington, D.C. national security prestige 
press make meaning of the concept of the “war on terrorism?”)  
Let’s briefly turn our conversation to your opinions on the term “war on terror.”  
17. Given the various definitions for “WOT,” how do you define the term? 
How do you use the term now? (How do you define “terror?”) 
18. What is your outlet policy on using the terms, “terrorism” or “war on 




Probe: How do you believe reporters should use these terms and what do you 
do? 
19. In your opinion, is using the word “terrorism” in your reporting taking a 
moral position?  
20. Do you feel that reporting on terrorism plays into the hands of the 
terrorist? 
21. How much do you feel the media should report on terrorist activities on 
the web? (Beheadings, Video Messages, etc.) 
22. How would you characterize the relationship between the media and 
terrorism?  
23. Scholars have offered potential operational solutions in the complex 
communication process that occurs among government, media and the 
citizenry including legislation, media self-restraint and public media 
education. Any opinions on potential solutions here?  
 (Related to RQ4: How does this press perceive the U.S. government rhetoric 
shift to “Overseas Contingency Operation” has influenced national security 
reporting?) 
24. How do you feel about the rhetoric shift from “WOT” to “Overseas 
Contingency Operation?” Probe: Has this influenced your reporting? 
How? 
To conclude, I want you to briefly look into the past and then the future.  
25. How do you feel reporters fared professionally in post-9/11 reporting? 




framing of the “WOT” issue or were they simply reporting official 
statements to the public?  
Probe: In your opinion, what effects has this post-9/11 backlash had on your job 
function?  
(Ramp Down) 
26. Any predictions for the future of NS journalism? 
That’s all the formal questions I have for our interview, but is there anything 
you would like to add at this point?  What should I have asked about that I didn’t? 
What other reporters do you know who might be willing to speak with me about 
covering this event? 
Thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed.  May I have a phone 
number or e-mail from you, just in case I need to clarify something from the interview 
or ask a follow-up question?  And if you would like a copy of our final report, let me 
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